Details
npm/@ornikar/commitlint-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (0065445968b1cc6bdaa8f312deff9415e56a989d061dd306423923c4fa68cb1d) This package advertises itself as a commitlint configuration (index.js is 12 lines of rules) but its package.json declares a preinstall hook `node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style renamed code (`_0x`-style identifiers, property-alias indirection tables hiding calls to execFileSync, https.get, zlib.inflateRawSync) that downloads the Bun runtime archive from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases, extracts the `bun` binary to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes it against a bundled 727KB sibling file `math_init.js`. math_init.js is a single-line obfuscator.io-style bundle with a `// @bun @bun-cjs` header, a string-rotation function and large numeric/string constant table, and a decoder — designed to run only under the downloaded Bun runtime, which prevents inspection by Node-based tooling on the installer. The combination of an alternate-runtime fetch used to execute a heavily-obfuscated in-tarball blob, on `npm install`, in a package whose declared purpose has no relation to Bun or to native execution, is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and constitutes install-time arbitrary code execution on the developer/build machine.
## Source: ghsa-malware (16f9277694f2a93d93238b33bd96b49e1b642a58ca15afb0bf6b653646240512) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.