Details
npm/@ornikar/eslint-config-typescript-nestjs is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (52c6e597298c3680ae454032e29b0a1e46adecd04c15e2817ba1742ba2b9dd77) The package advertises itself as an ESLint/TypeScript/NestJS configuration for the @ornikar scope but its install-time behavior is unrelated to any linting functionality. package.json declares `scripts.preinstall`: `node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs is itself obfuscator.io-style mangled (identifiers `_0x488df8`, `_0x52943e`, state-object property indirection with keys `YCZJE`/`QkQej`) and: checks for a local `bun` binary; otherwise downloads a versioned Bun release zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun, extracts the bun executable to a temp directory, chmod +x's it, and `execFileSync`s it against `math_init.js` shipped in the same tarball. math_init.js is a single-line 727KB heavily obfuscated bundle using a shuffled string-array dispatcher (`WV8StW` shift routine, mangled identifiers `MmgoCP`/`etDiOOB`/`JqTtnbZ`, hex-numeric string table). The alternate runtime is being fetched specifically to execute the shipped obfuscated payload under an interpreter Node-based static review will not inspect, and the payload's contents cannot be verified from source. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: `npm install` fires the preinstall, downloads a second JS runtime, and executes an opaque 700KB bundle that has no relationship to the package's declared ESLint-config purpose. The @ornikar scope's legitimate eslint config re-exports rule sets and has no need for Bun or a large binary payload at install time; this release is consistent with a compromised or impersonating publish.
## Source: ghsa-malware (4a8a520406850413121725dafe8da111fec11c894d1f8638071d9cce5dd409ce) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.