@ornikar/eslint-plugin-ornikar@24.0.3

npm/@ornikar/eslint-plugin-ornikar is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (5944a8610192e2e6ab71b9c27ae8bd6c67e02c59e1f8f8ace500ed5f83dc3b8b) The package's npm preinstall hook runs setup.mjs, an obfuscator.io-transformed bootstrap (renamed _0xXXXX identifiers and inline lookup objects wrapping calls to execFileSync('ldd', ['--version']) and readFileSync('/etc/os-release') for platform detection). setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, unzips it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line Bun-compiled bundle beginning with '// @bun @bun-cjs' and consisting of a custom-alphabet decoder (function hc1jfK9 over a 90+ character alphabet) driving a large opcode/string table. The filename math_init.js has no relation to the package's stated purpose (an ESLint plugin), and the payload's actual behavior is hidden behind the custom decoder. Executing the payload via a freshly downloaded alternate runtime is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: the code that runs on the installer's machine at `npm install` time is not Node-resolvable and is not visible to standard Node/npm-oriented scanners. An ESLint plugin has no legitimate need to fetch a separate JavaScript runtime at install and hand it an obfuscated opaque bundle. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd7b41d7b313e52db54b4fe55cf7955ed10a076009722e1bb97f9ae8f6138c12) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.