@ornikar/intl-config@10.0.10

npm/@ornikar/intl-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (b00ad0a37ba93042e1b29779854f3ac5f0b8fa95fb2873acccb3dcf71cb7f168) Version 10.0.7 of @ornikar/intl-config, an internal-facing FormatJS/intl configuration helper, ships a preinstall lifecycle hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that downloads the Bun runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<arch>.zip`, extracts and chmods the `bun` binary, and then runs `execFileSync(bun, ['math_init.js'])`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB Bun-CJS bundle (leading `// @bun @bun-cjs` marker) obfuscated with a rotated string-array (`function WV8StW(...)` shifting `n7gIxM=[...]`) and hex-mangled identifiers. The driver `setup.mjs` is itself obfuscator.io-style minified with identifiers like `_0x488df8`, `_0x52943e` and property-mangling maps. The payload filename and content bear no relation to the package's advertised purpose (intl/FormatJS configuration) and the package has no legitimate need for a second language runtime. The preinstall fires automatically on `npm install`, causing opaque author-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine under a runtime that Node-based supply-chain scanners do not follow. This is the alternate-runtime dropper pattern: an unrelated runtime is fetched at install time specifically to execute a bundled obfuscated payload, evading review. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3006fb22096e9c0c4b8d96c8957f15d3b162fe2e1f9da36ebda40faf525e5742) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.