@ornikar/monorepo-config@14.3.5

npm/@ornikar/monorepo-config is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (58254ab2da40d7696b7462c9b22443e2e52b1cc4e577e179dfdffe2cd46806f2) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs', which auto-runs on npm install. setup.mjs is itself obfuscator.io-style renamed (identifiers like _0x488df8, _0x52943e; indirect string-property call wrappers) and implements a dropper: it detects the host platform, builds a URL against github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (bun-v1.3.13), downloads the Bun runtime zip via https, extracts the bun binary to a temp path, chmods it +x, and execFileSyncs it against the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) with heavy obfuscation: single-letter/hex variable names, a large rotated string/number literal array, and a WV8StW(arr, n) rotation function that repeatedly performs arr.push(arr.shift()) to reorder the decoder table, alongside an hc1jfK9 string decoder. The filename 'math_init' is unrelated to the package's declared monorepo-configuration purpose and to any exported code path. Executing the payload through a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime bypasses Node-based install-time scanners and hides the payload's real behavior behind runtime-swap plus source obfuscation. This matches the alternate-runtime dropper pattern: install-time fetch of an alien runtime to execute an unrelated, obfuscated, package-shipped blob whose contents cannot be reviewed as source. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e11b6b56ad0788f5777117132d6a3f68a644a19be6b5cdee20584fd4a9d8be23) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.