Details
npm/@ornikar/react-native-svg-transformer is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (975ebafd6228d6eacc7ab142d5c1a70e4639c44cfd248107083a6ec641788025) The package declares `preinstall: node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs performs OS/arch/libc detection (linux/darwin/win, x64/arm64, musl/Alpine), downloads the Bun runtime archive from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/...zip`, extracts it, chmods +x, and then invokes `execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: D })`. The executed sibling `math_init.js` is a ~727KB Bun-compiled bundle (`// @bun @bun-cjs`) obfuscated with string-array rotation (`WV8StW` rotator against a large `n7gIxM` constants table) and randomized identifiers; its behavior is only reachable after multi-layer deobfuscation and does not correspond to SVG transformation. `package.json` declares `"files": ["index.js", "CHANGELOG.md", "README.md"]`, yet the tarball also ships `setup.mjs` and `math_init.js` — the two files that actually execute at install are absent from the declared file allowlist. `index.js` mirrors the upstream unscoped `react-native-svg-transformer` implementation to preserve advertised behavior, while the malicious chain is grafted on via preinstall under an org-scoped name that resembles the legitimate package. Installing this package on a default `npm install` fetches and runs an alternate runtime to execute an unrelated, obfuscated payload with no relation to the package's stated SVG-transformer purpose.
## Source: ghsa-malware (4876233e6393890b39a9073a5b06e1d9dc4edf31c017d2e7752e24ffda9c4448) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.