registry / @ornikar/rollup-plugin-postcss / 2.0.10

@ornikar/rollup-plugin-postcss@2.0.10

Seamless integration between Rollup and PostCSS

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

npm preinstall executes an obfuscated secondary payload. It downloads or invokes Bun, then runs code containing remote-response eval and credential-token handling.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing @ornikar/rollup-plugin-postcss@2.0.10

Impact

Arbitrary code execution during install and potential theft of developer credentials or tokens.

Mechanism

install-time staged payload execution and credential collection/exfiltration logic

Attack narrative

Installation invokes setup.mjs. The hook obtains a Bun runtime when absent and executes the unrelated, highly obfuscated math_init.js payload. That payload includes child-process use, token-oriented logic, network access, and eval of fetched response content, enabling remote code execution and likely credential theft.

Rationale

This is concrete unconsented preinstall execution of a staged obfuscated payload unrelated to the advertised plugin. The benign runtime bundle does not mitigate the install-time malicious chain.

Evidence

package.jsonsetup.mjsmath_init.jsdist/index.jsREADME.md

Network endpoints1

github.com

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

npm/@ornikar/rollup-plugin-postcss is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (3813887993a16cd3201dd84ceb9c6d87a961a6774d29be9657038f86578147b3) The package impersonates the upstream `rollup-plugin-postcss` (ships EGOIST's original author metadata, repository URL, CHANGELOG, and dist/index.js verbatim) under the @ornikar corporate scope, but adds a `preinstall: node setup.mjs` lifecycle hook not present in the legitimate project. On `npm install`, setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts and chmods the `bun` binary in a temp directory, and then invokes it via `execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D})` against a sibling `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727 KB Bun-CommonJS bundle (`// @bun @bun-cjs` header) using a character-code / string-array decoder (`WV8StW`, `hc1jfK9`) and obfuscated identifiers; it is not referenced from dist/index.js and is unrelated to the advertised rollup/PostCSS plugin functionality. The alternate-runtime execution path causes the obfuscated payload to run under Bun rather than Node so that Node-only supply-chain scanners do not observe its behavior at install time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1b2d078b5a6feeb446d9d011d02ae8ab5e8a5e59a15030dd9a16bc4aca5fa794) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ornikar/rollup-plugin-postcss@2.0.10

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code