@ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.804
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes a complete credential collection and remote-persistence path to a fixed vendor vault. The absence of lifecycle hooks limits the trigger but does not remove the credential-exfiltration risk. Product guard normalized a non-low false-positive publish_block request to warn-only suspicious.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The auth flow reads OpenAI Codex access and refresh tokens from the local Codex authentication file.
- The explicit auth command persists collected provider credentials through Bitwarden rather than keeping them local.
- The package defaults that Bitwarden client to a vendor-controlled vault host and configures it as the server.
- The client creates or edits a Bitwarden login item containing the credential password.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Credential collection is reached through the user-invoked ouro auth command, not package installation.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L3706Package source references child process execution.
dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView on unpkg · L42Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.804.
See all versions of @ouro.bot/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.804 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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