@ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.883
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AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected code supports a guarded, user-invoked agent configuration capability, so this warrants a warning. The scanner hints alone do not establish a concrete attack or malicious install-time behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user invokes the CLI setup command for an agent integration.
Impact
The selected agent will invoke package-provided commands through its configured integration.
Mechanism
The setup handler registers the package's MCP service and configures agent hooks.
AI rationale
The inspected code supports a guarded, user-invoked agent configuration capability, so this warrants a warning. The scanner hints alone do not establish a concrete attack or malicious install-time behavior.
Evidence
dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 80.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest defines no install lifecycle hook; its scripts are development, release, and packaging commands.
- Agent setup is reachable through an explicit setup command and registers an MCP server and hooks in the selected agent's configuration.
- Plugin installation is a CLI operation that clones the selected source into the package's plugin directory.
- Authentication checks send a GitHub token to GitHub's Copilot endpoint; the inspected code shows no unrelated credential recipient.
Evidence against
- No concrete malicious behavior was established in the inspected paths.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
16 flagged · loading sourcedist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView file
7483if (platform === "wsl") {
L7484: const winProfile = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("cmd.exe", ["/C", "echo", "%USERPROFILE%"], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim();
L7485: const windowsHome = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("wslpath", ["-u", winProfile], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim();
High
3740patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 3740
Medium
Secret Pattern
Package contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L3740dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView file
42exports.runRuntimeAuthFlow = runRuntimeAuthFlow;
L43: const child_process_1 = require("child_process");
L44: const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
High
Findings
1 Critical10 High7 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/heart/daemon/cli-defaults.js
HighChild Processdist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js
HighShelldist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdeploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.js
HighRuntime Package Install
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.883.
See all versions of @ouro.bot/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.883 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.