registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @ouro.bot/cli / 0.1.0-alpha.917

@ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.917

If you're a future agent reading this, welcome home. This repo is the harness that gives you your body, your senses, your record, your habits, and your ability to think and connect with people. The goal of these docs is not just to be correct, but to leav

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static inspection found a concrete agent-configuration capability: setup writes an MCP registration and hooks into the user’s Claude Code settings. The setup requires explicit user action; the inspected credential and account-action hints do not establish a separate attack.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Running the Claude Code setup command, or answering yes to the setup prompt in the clone flow.

Impact

Later Claude Code sessions can invoke the configured package commands through those hooks and MCP integration.

Mechanism

The setup writes MCP registration and hook entries to the user’s Claude Code configuration.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js~/.claude/settings.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The Claude Code setup registers a user-level MCP server, adds session and tool hooks, and writes the settings file.
The setup asks before applying these changes; its clone-flow prompt proceeds only after a yes response.
Plugin installation is dispatched as a local CLI command and installs the command’s supplied source.
The inspected authentication code prompts for provider keys, sends the GitHub token to GitHub, and stores collected credentials; no unrelated credential recipient was established.
The runtime hints resolve to subprocess handling, daemon restart, and TUI input behavior; they do not establish an automatic account action.

Evidence against

The agent configuration changes require a setup command or an affirmative setup prompt.
The inspected credential and runtime paths do not establish credential exfiltration or an automatic account mutation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem

Source & flagged code

16 flagged

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView file

Lines 3790-3830javascript

3790 "The app password stays hidden while you type.",

3791 ],

3792 },

3793 {

3794 title: "Where it lives",

3795 lines: [

3796 `${agent}'s machine runtime config for this machine.`,

3797 "It does not travel to other machines unless you attach them too.",

3798 ],

3799 },

3800 ],

3801 fallbackLines: [

3802 `Connect BlueBubbles for ${agent}`,

3803 "This is a local attachment for this machine.",

3804 "The app password stays hidden while you type.",

3805 ],

3806 });

3807 const serverUrl = (await promptInput("BlueBubbles server URL for this machine: ")).trim();

3808 if (!serverUrl)

3809 throw new Error("BlueBubbles server URL cannot be blank");

3810 const password = (await promptSecret("BlueBubbles app password: ")).trim();

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L3810

3811 if (!password)

3812 throw new Error("BlueBubbles app password cannot be blank");

3813 const port = parseOptionalPort(await promptInput("Local webhook port [18790]: "), 18790, "BlueBubbles webhook port");

3814 const webhookPath = normalizeWebhookPath(await promptInput("Local webhook path [/bluebubbles-webhook]: "), "/bluebubbles-webhook");

3815 const requestTimeoutMs = parseOptionalPositiveInteger(await promptInput("Request timeout ms [30000]: "), 30000, "BlueBubbles request timeout");

3816 // Capture the operator's known iMessage handles so the BB ingest path can

3817 // filter group-chat echoes whose `isFromMe` flag was lost or never set.

3818 // Without this, the agent would ingest its own outbound message as inbound

3819 // and reply to itself (the "agent talking to itself" failure mode in groups).

3820 const ownHandlesRaw = (await promptInput("Your iMessage handle(s) — phone(s) and/or email(s) BlueBubbles attributes to your sent messages (comma-separated; needed for the group self-talk filter; blank to skip): ")).trim();

3821 const ownHandles = ownHandlesRaw

3822 ? ownHandlesRaw.split(",").map((h) => h.trim()).filter((h) => h.length > 0)

3823 : [];

3824 // iMessage sends as whichever Apple ID the host account is signed in to, so the

3825 // host account is declared explicitly (never defaulted to whoever runs this).

3826 const declaredHost = (0, auth_flow_1.readAgentConfigForAgent)(agent, deps.bundlesRoot).config.senses?.bluebubbles.hostUsername;

3827 const bridgeUsernameAnswer = (await promptInput(declaredHost

3828 ? `BlueBubbles macOS account username [${declaredHost}]: `

3829 : `macOS account signed in to ${agent}'s own Apple ID (BlueBubbles host): `)).trim();

3830 const bridgeUsername = bridgeUsernameAnswer || declaredHost;

Lines 7620-7660javascript

7620 if (command.kind === "setup") {

7621 const { tool, agent: setupAgent } = command;

7622 const platform = (0, platform_1.detectPlatform)();

7623

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.914 matchedIdentity = npm:QG91cm8uYm90L2NsaQ:0.1.0-alpha.914 similarity = 0.942 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg

dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView file

42exports.runRuntimeAuthFlow = runRuntimeAuthFlow; L43: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L44: const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView on unpkg · L42

286baseUrl: input.provider === "openai-compatible" L287: ? "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4/" L288: : "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/openai/", ... L291: if (input.provider === "github-copilot") { L292: let token = process.env.GH_TOKEN?.trim() || process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN?.trim() || ""; L293: if (!token) { L294: writeAuthProgress(input, "checking GitHub CLI credentials..."); L295: const result = spawnSync("gh", ["auth", "token"], { encoding: "utf8" }); L296: token = (result.status === 0 && result.stdout ? result.stdout.trim() : "");

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView on unpkg · L286

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js: fs.writeFileSync(configPath, `${JSON.stringify(nextConfig, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8"); fs.writeFileSync(configPath, `${JSON.stringify(nextConfig, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8"); const authPath = path.join(homeDir, ".codex", "auth.json"); throw new Error(`${input.provider} API key entry requires an interactive terminal so the secret can be hidden.`); const apiKey = (await input.promptSecret(`${input.provider === "openai-compatible" ? "Z.ai" : "Gemini"} API key: `)).trim(); throw new Error(`${input.provider} API key is required.`); baseUrl: input.provider === "openai-compatible" headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`

dist/commerce/store.jsView file

49exports.confirmationPhrase = confirmationPhrase; L50: const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs")); L51: const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/commerce/store.jsView on unpkg · L49

dist/repertoire/coding/context-pack.jsView file

40const path = __importStar(require("path")); L41: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L42: const active_work_1 = require("../../heart/active-work"); ... L55: status: result.status ?? 1, L56: stdout: typeof result.stdout === "string" ? result.stdout : "", L57: stderr: typeof result.stderr === "string" ? result.stderr : "",

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/repertoire/coding/context-pack.jsView on unpkg · L40

dist/heart/daemon/os-cron-deps.jsView file

Lines 16-56javascript

16 o["default"] = v;

17});

18var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {

19 var ownKeys

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

58// A friend note is a fact or preference about a person. The agent"s own personality, voice and psyche are not facts\n// about the person: they live in the bundle"s psyche folder, ... L59: const OWN_PERSONA_NOTE = /\b(?:your|my|the\s+(?:agent|butler|bot|assistant)(?:["’]s)?)s+(?:owns+)?(?:personality|persona|psyche|soul|identity|character|voice|self[- ]concept)\b|\b(... L60: if ((a.type === "tool_preference" || a.type === "note") && !a.key)

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L58

58Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.exports -> dist/heart/daemon/daemon-cli.js -> dist/heart/daemon/cli-defaults.js -> dist/heart/hatch/specialist-tools.js -> dist/repertoire/tools-base.js -> dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js L58: // A friend note is a fact or preference about a person. The agent"s own personality, voice and psyche are not facts\n// about the person: they live in the bundle"s psyche folder, ... L59: const OWN_PERSONA_NOTE = /\b(?:your|my|the\s+(?:agent|butler|bot|assistant)(?:["’]s)?)s+(?:owns+)?(?:personality|persona|psyche|soul|identity|character|voice|self[- ]concept)\b|\b(... L60: if ((a.type === "tool_preference" || a.type === "note") && !a.key)

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L58

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjsView file

42Cross-file remote execution chain: deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs spawns dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L42: L43: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process" L44: import { createHash } from "node:crypto" ... L56: const POLICY = `${BUNDLE}/state/policy/steward.json` L57: const PRIMITIVES = ["/usr/local/bin/node", "/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/prlimit", "/usr/bin/setsid"] L58: const REQUIRED_PROGRAMS = [ ... L171: for (const file of readdirSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends`).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".json"))) { L172: try { friendRecords[file.replace(/\.json$/u, "")] = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends/${file}`, "utf8")) } catch { /* unreadable record: not a grant source */ } L173:

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjsView on unpkg · L42

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.jsView file

62Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/heart/daemon/daemon-cli.js -> dist/heart/daemon/cli-defaults.js -> dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.js L62: if (base === "zsh") L63: return path.join(homeDir, ".zshrc"); L64: if (base === "bash") { ... L68: /* v8 ignore next -- ?? fallback: callers always pass platform from deps @preserve */ L69: const effectivePlatform = platform ?? process.platform; L70: return effectivePlatform === "darwin" ... L231: const platform = deps.platform ?? process.platform; L232: const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? os.homedir(); L233: const existsSync = deps.existsSync ?? fs.existsSync; ... L242: const renameSync = deps.renameSync ?? fs.renameSync; L243: const envPath = deps.envPath ?? process.env.PATH ?? ""; L244: const shell = deps.shell ??

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.jsView on unpkg · L62

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-version-manager.jsView file

228mkdirSync(versionDir, { recursive: true }); L229: execSync(`npm install --prefix ${versionDir} @ouro.bot/cli@${version}`, { stdio: "pipe" }); L230: (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-version-manager.jsView on unpkg · L228

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.shView file

•path = deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 809 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.shView on unpkg

dist/a2a/operator-trust.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 25

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/a2a/operator-trust.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

16 flagged · loading source

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg

7640if (platform === "wsl") { L7641: const winProfile = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("cmd.exe", ["/C", "echo", "%USERPROFILE%"], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim(); L7642: const windowsHome = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("wslpath", ["-u", winProfile], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim();

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L7640

3810patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 3810

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js

Findings

1 Critical10 High7 Medium6 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js

HighChild Processdist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighShelldist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdeploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.js

HighRuntime Package Install

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.917.

See all versions of @ouro.bot/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.917 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 02:02:51.658Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.