registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @ouro.bot/cli / 0.1.0-alpha.926

@ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.926

If you're a future agent reading this, welcome home. This repo is the harness that gives you your body, your senses, your record, your habits, and your ability to think and connect with people. The goal of these docs is not just to be correct, but to leav

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection supports a warning for explicit user-command agent configuration: setup registers Ouro and writes hooks into Claude Code user settings. The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook, and the inspected credential flow does not substantiate the scanner's redirect claim.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the CLI setup command for Claude Code.

Impact

Later Claude Code sessions and selected tool actions invoke Ouro hooks, changing agent behavior through user-level configuration; no credential disclosure or destructive effect was established.

Mechanism

Setup writes Ouro commands as session start, session stop, and post-tool hooks in Claude Code settings.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/heart/daemon/cli-parse.jsdist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js~/.claude/settings.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI parses setup as an explicit command; the manifest exposes CLI entrypoints and its scripts show no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Claude Code setup registers Ouro at user scope and writes hooks to the Claude settings file.
The setup installs hooks for session start, session stop, and Bash, Edit, or Write actions.
Other flagged integration locations concern local Codex auth-file reads, provider-aligned authentication, project MCP configuration, and plugin installation from a supplied source.

Evidence against

The Claude configuration change is reached through the explicit setup command, not an npm install hook.
The inspected credential flow uses the selected provider's endpoint; GitHub Copilot token discovery sends its token to api.github.com.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

Source & flagged code

16 flagged

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView file

Lines 3795-3835javascript

3795 "The app password stays hidden while you type.",

3796 ],

3797 },

3798 {

3799 title: "Where it lives",

3800 lines: [

3801 `${agent}'s machine runtime config for this machine.`,

3802 "It does not travel to other machines unless you attach them too.",

3803 ],

3804 },

3805 ],

3806 fallbackLines: [

3807 `Connect BlueBubbles for ${agent}`,

3808 "This is a local attachment for this machine.",

3809 "The app password stays hidden while you type.",

3810 ],

3811 });

3812 const serverUrl = (await promptInput("BlueBubbles server URL for this machine: ")).trim();

3813 if (!serverUrl)

3814 throw new Error("BlueBubbles server URL cannot be blank");

3815 const password = (await promptSecret("BlueBubbles app password: ")).trim();

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L3815

3816 if (!password)

3817 throw new Error("BlueBubbles app password cannot be blank");

3818 const port = parseOptionalPort(await promptInput("Local webhook port [18790]: "), 18790, "BlueBubbles webhook port");

3819 const webhookPath = normalizeWebhookPath(await promptInput("Local webhook path [/bluebubbles-webhook]: "), "/bluebubbles-webhook");

3820 const requestTimeoutMs = parseOptionalPositiveInteger(await promptInput("Request timeout ms [30000]: "), 30000, "BlueBubbles request timeout");

3821 // Capture the operator's known iMessage handles so the BB ingest path can

3822 // filter group-chat echoes whose `isFromMe` flag was lost or never set.

3823 // Without this, the agent would ingest its own outbound message as inbound

3824 // and reply to itself (the "agent talking to itself" failure mode in groups).

3825 const ownHandlesRaw = (await promptInput("Your iMessage handle(s) — phone(s) and/or email(s) BlueBubbles attributes to your sent messages (comma-separated; needed for the group self-talk filter; blank to skip): ")).trim();

3826 const ownHandles = ownHandlesRaw

3827 ? ownHandlesRaw.split(",").map((h) => h.trim()).filter((h) => h.length > 0)

3828 : [];

3829 // iMessage sends as whichever Apple ID the host account is signed in to, so the

3830 // host account is declared explicitly (never defaulted to whoever runs this).

3831 const declaredHost = (0, auth_flow_1.readAgentConfigForAgent)(agent, deps.bundlesRoot).config.senses?.bluebubbles.hostUsername;

3832 const bridgeUsernameAnswer = (await promptInput(declaredHost

3833 ? `BlueBubbles macOS account username [${declaredHost}]: `

3834 : `macOS account signed in to ${agent}'s own Apple ID (BlueBubbles host): `)).trim();

3835 const bridgeUsername = bridgeUsernameAnswer || declaredHost;

Lines 7692-7732javascript

7692 if (command.kind === "setup") {

7693 const { tool, agent: setupAgent } = command;

7694 const platform = (0, platform_1.detectPlatform)();

7695

dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView file

Lines 22-62javascript

22 for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;

23 return ar;

24 };

dist/commerce/store.jsView file

Lines 29-69javascript

29 var result = {};

30 if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length

dist/repertoire/coding/context-pack.jsView file

Lines 20-60javascript

20 ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {

21 var ar = [];

22 for (var k in o) if (Object.

dist/heart/daemon/os-cron-deps.jsView file

Lines 16-56javascript

16 o["default"] = v;

17});

18var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {

19 var ownKeys

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

58// A friend note is a fact or preference about a person. The agent"s own personality, voice and psyche are not facts\n// about the person: they live in the bundle"s psyche folder, ... L59: const OWN_PERSONA_NOTE = /\b(?:your|my|the\s+(?:agent|butler|bot|assistant)(?:["’]s)?)s+(?:owns+)?(?:personality|persona|psyche|soul|identity|character|voice|self[- ]concept)\b|\b(... L60: if ((a.type === "tool_preference" || a.type === "note") && !a.key)

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L58

58Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.exports -> dist/heart/daemon/daemon-cli.js -> dist/heart/daemon/cli-defaults.js -> dist/heart/hatch/specialist-tools.js -> dist/repertoire/tools-base.js -> dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js L58: // A friend note is a fact or preference about a person. The agent"s own personality, voice and psyche are not facts\n// about the person: they live in the bundle"s psyche folder, ... L59: const OWN_PERSONA_NOTE = /\b(?:your|my|the\s+(?:agent|butler|bot|assistant)(?:["’]s)?)s+(?:owns+)?(?:personality|persona|psyche|soul|identity|character|voice|self[- ]concept)\b|\b(... L60: if ((a.type === "tool_preference" || a.type === "note") && !a.key)

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L58

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjsView file

42Cross-file remote execution chain: deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs spawns dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L42: L43: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process" L44: import { createHash } from "node:crypto" ... L56: const POLICY = `${BUNDLE}/state/policy/steward.json` L57: const PRIMITIVES = ["/usr/local/bin/node", "/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/prlimit", "/usr/bin/setsid"] L58: const REQUIRED_PROGRAMS = [ ... L171: for (const file of readdirSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends`).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".json"))) { L172: try { friendRecords[file.replace(/\.json$/u, "")] = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends/${file}`, "utf8")) } catch { /* unreadable record: not a grant source */ } L173:

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjsView on unpkg · L42

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.jsView file

62Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/heart/daemon/daemon-cli.js -> dist/heart/daemon/cli-defaults.js -> dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.js L62: if (base === "zsh") L63: return path.join(homeDir, ".zshrc"); L64: if (base === "bash") { ... L68: /* v8 ignore next -- ?? fallback: callers always pass platform from deps @preserve */ L69: const effectivePlatform = platform ?? process.platform; L70: return effectivePlatform === "darwin" ... L231: const platform = deps.platform ?? process.platform; L232: const homeDir = deps.homeDir ?? os.homedir(); L233: const existsSync = deps.existsSync ?? fs.existsSync; ... L242: const renameSync = deps.renameSync ?? fs.renameSync; L243: const envPath = deps.envPath ?? process.env.PATH ?? ""; L244: const shell = deps.shell ??

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.jsView on unpkg · L62

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-version-manager.jsView file

228mkdirSync(versionDir, { recursive: true }); L229: execSync(`npm install --prefix ${versionDir} @ouro.bot/cli@${version}`, { stdio: "pipe" }); L230: (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/heart/versioning/ouro-version-manager.jsView on unpkg · L228

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.shView file

•path = deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 809 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit18-target-audit.shView on unpkg

dist/a2a/operator-trust.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 24

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/a2a/operator-trust.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/heart/frontend-socket.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.925 matchedIdentity = npm:QG91cm8uYm90L2NsaQ:0.1.0-alpha.925 similarity = 0.967 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/heart/frontend-socket.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

16 flagged · loading source

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView file

7712if (platform === "wsl") { L7713: const winProfile = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("cmd.exe", ["/C", "echo", "%USERPROFILE%"], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim(); L7714: const windowsHome = (0, child_process_1.execFileSync)("wslpath", ["-u", winProfile], { stdio: "pipe" }).toString().trim();

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L7712

3815patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 3815

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.jsView on unpkg · L3815

dist/heart/auth/auth-flow.jsView file

42exports.runRuntimeAuthFlow = runRuntimeAuthFlow; L43: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L44: const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));

High

Findings

1 Critical10 High7 Medium6 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/heart/frontend-socket.js

HighChild Processdist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighShelldist/heart/daemon/cli-exec.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/heart/auth/auth-flow.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdeploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/repertoire/tools-notes.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/heart/versioning/ouro-path-installer.js

HighRuntime Package Install

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.926.

See all versions of @ouro.bot/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @ouro.bot/cli@0.1.0-alpha.926 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-14 19:22:07.289Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.