AI Security Review
scanned 5h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a developer control-plane CLI with user-invoked repo, shell, Supabase, and workspace operations; install-time behavior is limited to repairing node-pty helper permissions.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json postinstall only runs scripts/postinstall.mjs; prepare is build-only and not shipped as install attack logic.
- scripts/postinstall.mjs only chmods node-pty prebuilds/*/spawn-helper under reachable node_modules layouts.
- dist/cli/index.js shell rc and Claude config setup are interactive bootstrap prompts, not unconsented install-time mutation.
- dist/cli/index.js dynamic import loads local ovr.config.* from user workspaces for the CLI's declared config system.
- Network use is user-directed: fetch of import/pull source URLs, git remotes, localhost readiness checks, Supabase/Docker tooling.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration endpoint, remote payload execution, stealth persistence, or destructive install behavior found.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L284Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L37Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L37