@p4code/cli@0.8.14

P4 Code coding agent server and command-line client

AI Security Review

scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest exposes a CLI without an install hook, and the high-risk matches inspected resolve to local shell support, a runtime capability check, and an internal Claude history feature. The source inspection did not establish a concrete attack surface.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The CLI runs when invoked; its internal history worker is called by a CLI command.

Impact

No confirmed credential theft, destructive action, persistence, or agent control-surface abuse.

Mechanism

Inspected behavior supports local command execution and Claude history operations; no malicious payload execution or unauthorized transfer was established.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest identifies a CLI entrypoint and shows no install lifecycle hook or runtime dependency on itself.
The entrypoint dispatches commands only when the package is invoked as the CLI.
The indicated Claude configuration location reads environment values to select a configuration directory and project name.
The history worker accepts a session ID and handles only message retrieval or session forking; an internal CLI command hosts it.
The flagged process code starts a local shell for command execution, and the dynamic function match is a guarded capability check.
Other required review locations contain Effect and schema runtime code, frontend asset loaders, and an ACP JSON-RPC stream parser.

Evidence against

The inspected source does not support the scanner's reverse-shell or hidden-payload labels.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Source & flagged code

13 flagged

dist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BL9bAh79.mjsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3import { $t as runPromise, Bt as promise, Cn as tryPromise, I as fail, Mn as void_, St as map, ba as squash, f as asVoid, g as catchCause, mn as sync, o as andThen, q as flatMap, st as gen, tt as forkChild, u as as, un as succeed, wn as try_ } from "./Effect-B-zvTJgX.mjs";

4import { A as fromIterable, E as fromAsyncIterable, G as mapEffect, Nn as awaitAll, Pn as await_, Pt as unwrap, dt as runForEach, p as empty, st as runCollect } from "./Stream-CX7G9D0M.mjs";

5import * as NodeChildProcess from "node:child_process";

6import * as NodeReadline from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BL9bAh79.mjsView on unpkg · L4

7//#region ../../packages/shared/src/mcpResponsePayloads.ts

8/**

9* Reads the JSON-RPC payloads of a response from an MCP streamable-HTTP

10* endpoint. Used on the ACP bridge fast path, so it imports only effect core.

11*

12* @module mcpResponsePayloads

13*/

14async function* sseDataLines(response) {

15 if (response.body === null) return;

16 const decoder = new TextDecoder();

17 let buffered = "";

18 for await (const chunk of response.body) {

19 buffered += decoder.decode(chunk, { stream: true });

20 let separatorIndex = buffered.search(/\n\n|\r\n\r\n/u);

21 while (separatorIndex !== -1) {

22 const rawEvent = buffered.slice(0, separatorIndex);

23 buffered = buffered.slice(separatorIndex).replace(/^(?:\r?\n){2}/u, "");

24 const data = rawEvent.split(/\r?\n/u).filter((line) => line.startsWith("data:")).map((line) => line.slice(5).

dist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjsView file

11import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; L12: import * as sw from "node:child_process"; L13: import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; ... L21: import Pxe, { promisify as promisify$1 } from "util"; L22: import Gxe from "http"; L23: import Wxe from "https"; ... L187: function U(e, t, n, r, o) { L188: if (r === "m") throw TypeError("Private method is not writable"); L189: if (r === "a" && !o) throw TypeError("Private accessor was defined without a setter"); ... L323: try { L324: return JSON.parse(e); L325: } catch (t) {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjsView on unpkg · L11

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjsView on unpkg · L11

43674try { L43675: return new Function(""), !0; L43676: } catch (e) {

High

dist/resource-monitor/darwin-arm64/t3-resource-monitorView file

•path = dist/resource-monitor/darwin-arm64/t3-resource-monitor kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 546160 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/resource-monitor/darwin-arm64/t3-resource-monitorView on unpkg

dist/client/assets/ghostty-vt-DdA0Zryv.wasmView file

•path = dist/client/assets/ghostty-vt-DdA0Zryv.wasm kind = wasm_module sizeBytes = 630932 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Wasm Module

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

dist/client/assets/ghostty-vt-DdA0Zryv.wasmView on unpkg

dist/binCli-BvhJ8Jqb.mjsView file

•path = dist/binCli-BvhJ8Jqb.mjs kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 13875542 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Oversized Source File

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

dist/binCli-BvhJ8Jqb.mjsView on unpkg

•path = dist/binCli-BvhJ8Jqb.mjs kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint sizeBytes = 13875542 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Oversized Cli Entrypoint

Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.

dist/binCli-BvhJ8Jqb.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

13 flagged · loading source

dist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BL9bAh79.mjsView file

4import { A as fromIterable, E as fromAsyncIterable, G as mapEffect, Nn as awaitAll, Pn as await_, Pt as unwrap, dt as runForEach, p as empty, st as runCollect } from "./Stream-CX7G... L5: import * as NodeChildProcess from "node:child_process"; L6: import * as NodeReadline from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BL9bAh79.mjsView on unpkg · L4

dist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

Findings

2 Critical7 High7 Medium4 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

CriticalReverse Shelldist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

HighChild Processdist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BL9bAh79.mjs

HighShell

HighEvaldist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/claudeHistoryWorker-BvaF6m2o.mjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Native Binarydist/resource-monitor/darwin-arm64/t3-resource-monitor

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @p4code/cli@0.8.14.

See all versions of @p4code/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @p4code/cli@0.8.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-17 18:35:08.108Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.