@p4code/cli@0.8.25
⚠ Under reviewP4 Code coding agent server and command-line client
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source does not confirm the scanner’s credential-exfiltration or reverse-shell claims. A clean verdict requires citations for 203 paths, exceeding the 128-citation limit, so the package needs manual review rather than a clean classification.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest declares the p4c CLI entrypoint and contains no install lifecycle hook.
- The entrypoint loads the CLI or ACP bridge when invoked.
- The worker’s bash-session environment copy omits ANTHROPIC_ variables.
- The flagged worker location reads Claude configuration paths and uses them to derive project storage locations.
- The inspected source does not establish credential exfiltration or a reverse shell; the flagged worker excerpts show local shell-session and Claude project-path handling.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/AcpMcpStdioBridge-BuIIHL4p.mjsView on unpkg · L4Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/claudeHistoryWorker-js6Jgg9C.mjsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @p4code/cli@0.8.25.
See all versions of @p4code/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @p4code/cli@0.8.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.