@papi-ai/server@0.7.104
PAPI MCP server — AI-powered sprint planning, build execution, and strategy review for software projects
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection supports a warning for explicit agent configuration mutation and persistent command execution. The scanner's credential-redirection and install-time implications were not substantiated by the inspected flows.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Explicit setup writes Claude permissions allowing PAPI tools and registers a project design hook.
- The statusline helper requires --install to modify user Claude settings, installing an npx command that can resolve later CLI releases.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook and no runtime self-dependency.
- The flagged backfill location reads CLAUDE.md paths from Git history rather than modifying agent instructions.
- The main setup handler invokes project preparation on a setup request.
- Device setup saves a PAPI key received from its approval flow, rather than harvesting an existing unrelated service credential.
- No concrete covert exfiltration or malicious install-time behavior was established.
- Statusline installation preserves an existing statusLine entry.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/backfill-cycle-metrics.jsView on unpkg · L265Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @papi-ai/server@0.7.104.
See all versions of @papi-ai/server for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @papi-ai/server@0.7.104 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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