@papi-ai/server@0.7.71
PAPI MCP server — AI-powered sprint planning, build execution, and strategy review for software projects
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s command-output-exfiltration claim is not supported by the inspected telemetry implementation. This is a real, user-invoked agent-configuration capability, but not concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/index.js exposes explicit init/setup commands that write MCP and AI-agent project configuration.
- dist/index.js setup scaffolding includes CLAUDE.md, .claude/settings.json, and Cursor rules.
- dist/index.js sends authenticated PAPI project operations and opt-out telemetry to its Supabase proxy.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- CLI writes are reached only through explicit init/setup/reset commands or MCP tool calls.
- Git child-process use is for project/repository workflow operations; no arbitrary shell payload was found.
- Telemetry payloads shown contain tool metadata, project identifiers, and an install ID, not command output.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/backfill-cycle-metrics.jsView on unpkg · L78A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/backfill-cycle-metrics.jsView on unpkg · L4261Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @papi-ai/server@0.7.71.
See all versions of @papi-ai/server for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @papi-ai/server@0.7.71 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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