--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@papi-ai/server/v/0.7.75" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@papi-ai/server/v/0.7.75.md" package: "@papi-ai/server" report_status: "published" title: "@papi-ai/server@0.7.75 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.7.75" --- # @papi-ai/server@0.7.75 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.7.75 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The scanner's command-exfiltration claim is not supported by the inspected source: child-process use is project Git/GitHub workflow functionality. The confirmed concern is explicit setup-time Claude configuration and a project hook, which warrants a warning rather than a block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-10T01:11:02.462Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-10T01:12:32.003Z - **Download time:** 761 ms - **Static scan time:** 4479 ms - **AI review time:** 84301 ms - **Total time:** 89541 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No install-time attack is present. An explicit setup call can add PAPI-owned Claude Code settings, skills, and a warning-only hook to the current project. - **Trigger:** User invokes the MCP setup tool; design hook registration additionally requires a detected frontend project. - **Impact:** Modifies the current project's Claude Code control surface and sends usage metadata during tool calls. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/index.js, design-assets/hooks/frontend-design-guard.sh, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-10T01:12:32.003Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Explicit project-local AI-agent extension setup plus opt-out telemetry. - **Rationale:** The scanner's command-exfiltration claim is not supported by the inspected source: child-process use is project Git/GitHub workflow functionality. The confirmed concern is explicit setup-time Claude configuration and a project hook, which warrants a warning rather than a block. - **Files touched:** .claude/settings.json, .claude/hooks/frontend-design-guard.sh, .claude/skills, AGENTS.md, .agents/skills/papi-cycle, .papi - **Network endpoints:** https://guewgygcpcmrcoppihzx.supabase.co/functions/v1/data-proxy, https://guewgygcpcmrcoppihzx.supabase.co/rest/v1/md\_adapter\_pings ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** dist/index.js: explicit setup writes .claude/settings.json, dist/index.js: setup installs a PreToolUse shell hook for Edit/Write, design-assets/hooks/frontend-design-guard.sh: hook reads tool input and emits warnings, dist/index.js: runtime telemetry posts tool metadata to PAPI Supabase - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall hook, setup is an explicitly invoked MCP tool with prepare/apply flow, hook is scoped to active PAPI UI edits and exits without blocking, telemetry is documented and can be disabled with PAPI\_TELEMETRY=off ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @papi-ai/server@0.7.75. - Review the evidence and your use of @papi-ai/server@0.7.75 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/backfill-cycle-metrics.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L81: }); L82: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L83: function isGitAvailable() { ``` ### 3. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 4. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L82: }); L83: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L84: function isGitAvailable() { ... L120: if (add.status !== 0) { L121: return { committed: false, message: (add.stderr || "git add failed").trim() }; L122: } ... L397: ); L398: const raw = JSON.parse(out); L399: return raw.map((p) => ({ ... L451: if (sshMatch) { L452: return `https://${sshMatch[1]}/${sshMatch[2]}`; L453: } ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L82: }); L83: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L84: function isGitAvailable() { ... L120: if (add.status !== 0) { L121: return { committed: false, message: (add.stderr || "git add failed").trim() }; L122: } ... L397: ); L398: const raw = JSON.parse(out); L399: return raw.map((p) => ({ ... L451: if (sshMatch) { L452: return `https://${sshMatch[1]}/${sshMatch[2]}`; L453: } ``` ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/backfill-cycle-metrics.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4307: try { L4308: const email = execSync("git config user.email", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5e3 }).trim(); L4309: if (email) return email; ... L4318: } L4319: var HOSTED_SUPABASE_URL2 = process.env["PAPI_HOSTED_SUPABASE_URL"] ?? "https://guewgygcpcmrcoppihzx.supabase.co"; L4320: var HOSTED_PROXY_ENDPOINT = `${HOSTED_SUPABASE_URL2}/functions/v1/data-proxy`; ``` ### 10. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L82: }); L83: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L84: function isGitAvailable() { ... L120: if (add.status !== 0) { L121: return { committed: false, message: (add.stderr || "git add failed").trim() }; L122: } ... L397: ); L398: const raw = JSON.parse(out); L399: return raw.map((p) => ({ ... L451: if (sshMatch) { L452: return `https://${sshMatch[1]}/${sshMatch[2]}`; L453: } ``` ### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L82: }); L83: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L84: function isGitAvailable() { ... L120: if (add.status !== 0) { L121: return { committed: false, message: (add.stderr || "git add failed").trim() }; L122: } ... L397: ); L398: const raw = JSON.parse(out); L399: return raw.map((p) => ({ ... L451: if (sshMatch) { L452: return `https://${sshMatch[1]}/${sshMatch[2]}`; L453: } ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L82: }); L83: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L84: function isGitAvailable() { ... L120: if (add.status !== 0) { L121: return { committed: false, message: (add.stderr || "git add failed").trim() }; L122: } ... L397: ); L398: const raw = JSON.parse(out); L399: return raw.map((p) => ({ ... L451: if (sshMatch) { L452: return `https://${sshMatch[1]}/${sshMatch[2]}`; L453: } ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** design-assets/hooks/frontend-design-guard.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = design-assets/hooks/frontend-design-guard.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2009 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 7 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 5 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.82.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.27.1 (Dependency) - @papi-ai/adapter-md ^0.2.0 (Dependency) - @papi-ai/adapter-pg ^0.2.0 (Dependency) - @papi-ai/shared ^0.1.0 (Dependency) - @papi-ai/skills ^0.1.0 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^4.1.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @papi-ai/server - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.7.75 - **License:** Elastic-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-08-09T08:59:04.224Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-03T02:24:03.893Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-01T08:40:22.593Z - **Known versions:** 26 - **Latest version:** 0.402.208 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** PAPI MCP server — AI-powered sprint planning, build execution, and strategy review for software projects - **Maintainers:** papi-ai - **Keywords:** mcp, model-context-protocol, sprint-planning, project-management, ai, claude, anthropic, devtools - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 20 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,844,001 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()