registry / @phnx-labs/agents-cli / 1.22.103

@phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103

One CLI for all your AI coding agents - versions, config, cloud dispatch, sessions, and teams (now with first-class Grok Build CLI support)

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package has a concrete automatic persistence and shell-environment mutation surface, warranting a warning. The code inspected does not establish the stronger malicious behaviors required for a publish block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

npm installation, especially a global install on macOS or Linux.

Impact

The package can persist a background process and affect future shell command resolution without an explicit setup command.

Mechanism

Postinstall writes user paths, modifies PATH resolution, and registers or starts a daemon.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsdist/lib/daemon/daemon.js~/.agents~/.agents/.cache/shims~/.local/bin/agents~/.local/bin/ag~/.bash_profile~/.profile~/.config/systemd/user/agents-daemon.service~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.phnx-labs.agents-daemon.plist

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The automatic postinstall hook runs a package script.
Postinstall creates user-level agent directories even for a local install.
On global installs, postinstall can start an always-on daemon without an interactive consent check.
The daemon installs a persistent user systemd unit that restarts automatically.
The package can append its bin directory to a login shell profile during postinstall when command resolution fails.

Evidence against

The persistence and configuration are scoped to this vendor's agents CLI and its user state, not a confirmed foreign agent control surface.
No automatic network request, credential exfiltration, self-dependency, or remote payload execution was confirmed in the inspected install path.
Artifact-sharing network requests are in an explicit CLI command rather than the lifecycle hook.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Source & flagged code

23 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 30-70json

30 "CHANGELOG.md",

31 "README.md",

32 "LICENSE"

33 ],

34 "publishConfig": {

35 "provenance": true

36 },

37 "repository": {

38 "type": "git",

39 "url": "git+https://github.com/phnx-labs/agi-cli.git"

40 },

41 "homepage": "https://agents-cli.sh",

42 "bugs": {

43 "url": "https://github.com/phnx-labs/agi-cli/issues"

44 },

45 "scripts": {

46 "build": "tsc && rm -rf 'dist/lib/menubar/MenubarHelper.app' && ([ -f 'bin/agents-macos' ] && mkdir -p dist/bin && cp -f 'bin/agents-macos' 'dist/bin/agents' && chmod 755 'dist/bin/agents' || true)",

47 "build:bin": "scripts/build-bin.sh",

48 "prepare": "npm run build",

49 "prepack": "cp ../README.md README.md",

50 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L50

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L50

51 "dev": "tsx src/index.ts",

52 "changelog": "bun scripts/gen-changelog.ts",

53 "gen:index": "bun scripts/gen-command-index.ts",

54 "verify:index": "bash scripts/verify-command-index.sh",

55 "start": "node dist/index.js",

56 "test": "TZ=UTC node ./node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs run",

57 "bench": "node ./node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs bench --run",

58 "typecheck:bench": "tsc --noEmit --ignoreConfig --skipLibCheck --module esnext --moduleResolution bundler --target es2022 --strict --esModuleInterop --lib es2022 --types node src/lib/*.bench.ts src/lib/**/*.bench.ts",

59 "test:remote": "scripts/sandbox.sh test",

60 "verify-docs": "scripts/verify-docs.sh",

61 "test:watch": "node ./node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs"

62 },

63 "keywords": [

64 "agents",

65 "cli",

66 "dotfiles",

67 "claude",

68 "codex",

69 "cursor",

70 "opencode",

dist/bootstrap.jsView file

Lines 405-445javascript

405async function promptUpgrade(latestVersion) {

406 const { default: ora } = await import('ora');

407 const {

dist/lib/monitors/state.jsView file

Lines 187-227javascript

187 .map((e) => e.name)

188 .sort();

189 const fires = [];

190 for (const id

dist/lib/sqlite.jsView file

Lines 1-35javascript

1/**

2 * Runtime-aware compatibility shim for SQLite.

3 *

4 * Picks `bun:sqlite` under Bun and `node:sqlite` under Node (>=22.5). Avoids

5 * the native `better-sqlite3` addon entirely so there is no prebuild compile

6 * and no Node/Bun ABI mismatch. Both runtimes are production: `dist/index.js`

7 * runs under Node, while the signed standalone `dist/bin/agents` (what the

8 * shims exec) embeds Bun.

9 *

10 * Exposes the small better-sqlite3-shaped surface area the rest of the

dist/lib/platform/ipc.jsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1/**

2 * Local-daemon IPC endpoint, platform-aware.

3 */

4import * as crypto from 'crypto';

5/**

6 * Resolve the address a local daemon listens on / clients connect to.

7 *

8 * POSIX: the AF_UNIX socket file path itself.

dist/lib/menubar/install-menubar.jsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1/**

2 * Install + lifecycle for the macOS menu-bar helper (`MenubarHelper.app`).

3 *

4 * Mirrors the stable-Application-Support-path-survives-npm-re-sign pattern and

5 * a RunAtLoad + KeepAlive user service, the same shape the deleted embedded

6 * secrets-agent used before it moved to the standalone secrets-cli (PHNX-3989).

7 *

8 * The helper is a no-Dock `.accessory` status-bar app. It reads live agent

9 * state directly from disk and shells `agents` only for actions, so the plist

10 * bakes in the node interpreter + entry point + bin path so the GUI process can

dist/lib/cloud/factory.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

11* completion with `--output-format stream-json`, buffers the NDJSON events, and L12: * `stream()` replays them. The task id is droid"s own `session_id` (captured\n * from the run output), so it lines up with `droid exec -s <id>` for future\n * resume support.\n *\n... L13: * row as the computer name and keep the remainder as a label, skipping headers, ... L50: * the Droid relay. The relay is used as an OpenSSH ProxyCommand L51: * (`droid computer ssh <name> --proxy`), so the connection rides Factory"s\n * brokered tunnel rather than a directly reachable host.\n *\n * `remoteArgv` is the already-built remo... L52: events.push({ type: "unknown", name: "stdout", data: trimmed, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

dist/lib/cloud/factory.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L11

dist/commands/setup-fleet.jsView file

8import chalk from 'chalk'; L9: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L10: import { getCliLaunch } from '../lib/cli-entry.js'; ... L24: const launch = getCliLaunch(args); L25: const res = spawnSync(launch.command, launch.args, { stdio: 'inherit', env: process.env }); L26: if ((res.status ?? 1) === 0) ... L49: console.error(chalk.red('Tailscale is not installed or not on PATH.')); L50: const platform = process.platform; L51: console.log(chalk.bold('\nInstall Tailscale, then re-run `agents setup fleet`:')); ... L53: console.log(chalk.cyan(' brew install --cask tailscale')); L54: console.log(chalk.gray(' or install from https://tailscale.com/download/mac')); L55: }

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/commands/setup-fleet.jsView on unpkg · L8

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/commands/setup-fleet.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/commands/setup-fleet.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/daemon/daemon.jsView file

13Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L77: const LOG_ROTATE_COUNT = 3; L78: const PLIST_NAME = 'com.phnx-labs.agents-daemon'; L79: const SYSTEMD_UNIT = 'agents-daemon.service'; ... L201: const dir = getDaemonDir(); L202: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L203: return dir; ... L302: export function writeDaemonPid(pid) { L303: fs.writeFileSync(getPidPath(), String(pid), 'utf-8'); L304: } ... L327: try { L328: fs.writeFileSync(getHeartbeatPath(), JSON.stringify(hb), 'utf-8'); L329: } Write operation from scripts/postinstall.js: L13: const HOME = os.homedir(); L14: const USER_DIR = path.join(HOME, '.agents'); L15: const SHIMS_DIR = path.join(USER_DIR, '.cache', 'shims'); L16: // System repo lives inside the user repo (folded in v1.21). Legacy installs at

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

dist/lib/daemon/daemon.jsView on unpkg · L13

dist/lib/installations/migrate.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. function migraterunsintoroutines() { const src = path.join(user_dir, 'runs'); const dest = path.join(user_dir, 'routines', 'runs'); if (!fs.existssync(src) || fs.existssync(dest)) return; try { fs.mkdirsync(path.dirname(dest), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); fs.renamesync(src, dest); } catch { } } function migratetrashtohidden() { const src = path.join(user_dir, 'trash'); const dest = path.join(user_dir, '.trash'); if (!fs.existssync(src) || fs.existssync(dest)) return; try { fs.renamesync(src, dest); } catch {

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/lib/installations/migrate.jsView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

9Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> scripts/postinstall.js L9: import * as readline from 'readline'; L10: import { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L11: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; L12: L13: const HOME = os.homedir(); L14: const USER_DIR = path.join(HOME, '.agents'); ... L26: function resolveAgentsBin() { L27: if (process.platform !== 'darwin') return AGENTS_JS_ENTRYPOINT; L28: try { ... L87: const target = path.join(SHIMS_DIR, name); L88: const script = `#!/bin/sh\nAGENTS_BIN=${shellQuote(AGENTS_BIN)}\nif [ -z "$AGENTS_BIN" ] || [ ! -x "$AGENTS_BIN" ]; then\n echo "agents: agents-cli entrypoint missing or not execu... L89: fs.writeFileSync(target, script, { mode: 0o755 });

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L9

dist/commands/computer.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 41

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/commands/computer.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/lib/tmux/binary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/tmux/binary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/tmux/binary.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/browser/ffmpeg.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/browser/ffmpeg.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/browser/ffmpeg.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/installations/versions.jsView file

•matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/installations/versions.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 48 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/installations/versions.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/loop.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/loop.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/loop.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/session/provenance.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/session/provenance.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/session/provenance.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/auto-pull.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/auto-pull.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/auto-pull.jsView on unpkg

dist/commands/message.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/commands/message.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/commands/message.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib/analytics/usage-db.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/analytics/usage-db.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/analytics/usage-db.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

23 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/bootstrap.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.102 matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.102 similarity = 0.808 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Findings

3 Critical16 High6 Medium6 Low

CriticalDownload Executedist/lib/cloud/factory.js#virtual:normalized:round1

CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackdist/lib/daemon/daemon.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/bootstrap.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/bootstrap.js

HighShelldist/lib/monitors/state.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/commands/setup-fleet.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/lib/installations/migrate.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencescripts/postinstall.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/commands/computer.js#virtual:normalized:round1

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103.

See all versions of @phnx-labs/agents-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-12 17:01:59.922Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code