--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/v/1.22.103" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/v/1.22.103.md" package: "@phnx-labs/agents-cli" report_status: "published" title: "@phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.22.103" --- # @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 1.22.103 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package has a concrete automatic persistence and shell-environment mutation surface, warranting a warning. The code inspected does not establish the stronger malicious behaviors required for a publish block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-12T17:00:45.561Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-12T17:01:59.922Z - **Download time:** 773 ms - **Static scan time:** 13275 ms - **AI review time:** 60310 ms - **Total time:** 74361 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package runs postinstall code that creates user agent state, can alter command resolution, and starts a persistent routines daemon on macOS or Linux. This is a meaningful lifecycle and persistence risk, but no confirmed theft or remote payload chain was found. - **Trigger:** npm installation, especially a global install on macOS or Linux. - **Impact:** The package can persist a background process and affect future shell command resolution without an explicit setup command. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, dist/lib/daemon/daemon.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-12T17:01:59.922Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Postinstall writes user paths, modifies PATH resolution, and registers or starts a daemon. - **Rationale:** The package has a concrete automatic persistence and shell-environment mutation surface, warranting a warning. The code inspected does not establish the stronger malicious behaviors required for a publish block. - **Files touched:** ~/.agents, ~/.agents/.cache/shims, ~/.local/bin/agents, ~/.local/bin/ag, ~/.bash\_profile, ~/.profile, ~/.config/systemd/user/agents-daemon.service, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.phnx-labs.agents-daemon.plist ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** The automatic postinstall hook runs a package script., Postinstall creates user-level agent directories even for a local install., On global installs, postinstall can start an always-on daemon without an interactive consent check., The daemon installs a persistent user systemd unit that restarts automatically., The package can append its bin directory to a login shell profile during postinstall when command resolution fails. - **Evidence against:** The persistence and configuration are scoped to this vendor's agents CLI and its user state, not a confirmed foreign agent control surface., No automatic network request, credential exfiltration, self-dependency, or remote payload execution was confirmed in the inspected install path., Artifact-sharing network requests are in an explicit CLI command rather than the lifecycle hook. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103. - Review the evidence and your use of @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.103 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bootstrap.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L425: if (answer === 'now') { L426: const { spawnSync } = await import('child_process'); L427: let spinner = ora('Resolving package metadata...').start(); ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/monitors/state.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L207: * anything else (nonzero, timeout, spawn error, empty command) is "no effect". L208: * Real `/bin/sh -c` (or `cmd /c`) — the same seam command sources use. L209: */ ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/sqlite.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L15: const isBun = typeof globalThis.Bun !== 'undefined'; L16: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L17: // node:sqlite emits a process-level ExperimentalWarning the first time it loads. ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/platform/ipc.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: * touching disk, and never probe the result with fs.existsSync (it always reports L13: * false). Both forms are accepted by net.createServer / net.createConnection. L14: */ L15: export function ipcEndpoint(socketPath, platform = process.platform) { L16: if (platform === 'win32') { ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/menubar/install-menubar.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L17: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; L18: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L19: import * as fs from 'fs'; ... L73: function onDarwin() { L74: return process.platform === 'darwin'; L75: } ... L77: function installDir() { L78: return path.join(os.homedir(), 'Library', 'Application Support', INSTALL_DIR_NAME); L79: } ... L123: try { L124: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L125: if (parsed && (parsed.source === 'release' || parsed.source === 'local')) ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/cloud/factory.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L11: * completion with `--output-format stream-json`, buffers the NDJSON events, and L12: * `stream()` replays them. The task id is droid"s own `session_id` (captured\n * from the run output), so it lines up with `droid exec -s ` for future\n * resume support.\n *\n... L13: * row as the computer name and keep the remainder as a label, skipping headers, ... L50: * the Droid relay. The relay is used as an OpenSSH ProxyCommand L51: * (`droid computer ssh --proxy`), so the connection rides Factory"s\n * brokered tunnel rather than a directly reachable host.\n *\n * `remoteArgv` is the already-built remo... L52: events.push({ type: "unknown", name: "stdout", data: trimmed, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() }); ``` ### 14. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/setup-fleet.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: import chalk from 'chalk'; L9: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L10: import { getCliLaunch } from '../lib/cli-entry.js'; ... L24: const launch = getCliLaunch(args); L25: const res = spawnSync(launch.command, launch.args, { stdio: 'inherit', env: process.env }); L26: if ((res.status ?? 1) === 0) ... L49: console.error(chalk.red('Tailscale is not installed or not on PATH.')); L50: const platform = process.platform; L51: console.log(chalk.bold('\nInstall Tailscale, then re-run `agents setup fleet`:')); ... L53: console.log(chalk.cyan(' brew install --cask tailscale')); L54: console.log(chalk.gray(' or install from https://tailscale.com/download/mac')); L55: } ``` ### 15. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/daemon/daemon.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L77: const LOG_ROTATE_COUNT = 3; L78: const PLIST_NAME = 'com.phnx-labs.agents-daemon'; L79: const SYSTEMD_UNIT = 'agents-daemon.service'; ... L201: const dir = getDaemonDir(); L202: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L203: return dir; ... L302: export function writeDaemonPid(pid) { L303: fs.writeFileSync(getPidPath(), String(pid), 'utf-8'); L304: } ... L327: try { L328: fs.writeFileSync(getHeartbeatPath(), JSON.stringify(hb), 'utf-8'); L329: } Write operation from scripts/postinstall.js: L13: const HOME = os.homedir(); L14: const USER_DIR = path.join(HOME, '.agents'); L15: const SHIMS_DIR = path.join(USER_DIR, '.cache', 'shims'); L16: // System repo lives inside the user repo (folded in v1.21). Legacy installs at ``` ### 16. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/installations/migrate.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. function migraterunsintoroutines() { const src = path.join(user_dir, 'runs'); const dest = path.join(user_dir, 'routines', 'runs'); if (!fs.existssync(src) || fs.existssync(dest)) return; try { fs.mkdirsync(path.dirname(dest), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); fs.renamesync(src, dest); } catch { } } function migratetrashtohidden() { const src = path.join(user_dir, 'trash'); const dest = path.join(user_dir, '.trash'); if (!fs.existssync(src) || fs.existssync(dest)) return; try { fs.renamesync(src, dest); } catch { ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> scripts/postinstall.js L9: import * as readline from 'readline'; L10: import { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L11: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; L12: L13: const HOME = os.homedir(); L14: const USER_DIR = path.join(HOME, '.agents'); ... L26: function resolveAgentsBin() { L27: if (process.platform !== 'darwin') return AGENTS_JS_ENTRYPOINT; L28: try { ... L87: const target = path.join(SHIMS_DIR, name); L88: const script = `#!/bin/sh\nAGENTS_BIN=${shellQuote(AGENTS_BIN)}\nif [ -z "$AGENTS_BIN" ] || [ ! -x "$AGENTS_BIN" ]; then\n echo "agents: agents-cli entrypoint missing or not execu... L89: fs.writeFileSync(target, script, { mode: 0o755 }); ``` ### 18. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 19. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 21. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/computer.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 41 ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/tmux/binary.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/tmux/binary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/browser/ffmpeg.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/browser/ffmpeg.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 95.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/installations/versions.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/installations/versions.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 48 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/loop.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/loop.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/session/provenance.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/session/provenance.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/setup-fleet.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/commands/setup-fleet.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/auto-pull.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/auto-pull.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/message.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/commands/message.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/analytics/usage-db.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.66 matchedPath = dist/lib/analytics/usage-db.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.66 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 31. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/bootstrap.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.102 matchedIdentity = npm:QHBobngtbGFicy9hZ2VudHMtY2xp:1.22.102 similarity = 0.808 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare - **Dependencies:** 28 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 10 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 28 ### Published dependency entries - @fontsource/inter ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - @fontsource/jetbrains-mono ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - @homebridge/node-pty-prebuilt-multiarch 0.14.1 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts 8.5.2 (Dependency) - @resvg/resvg-wasm ^2.6.2 (Dependency) - @types/proper-lockfile 4.1.4 (Dependency) - @xterm/headless 6.0.0 (Dependency) - @zed-industries/agent-client-protocol 0.4.5 (Dependency) - acorn 8.18.0 (Dependency) - aws4fetch 1.0.20 (Dependency) - chalk 5.6.2 (Dependency) - commander 15.0.0 (Dependency) - croner 10.0.1 (Dependency) - diff 9.0.0 (Dependency) - esbuild ^0.28.2 (Dependency) - lru-cache 11.5.2 (Dependency) - marked 15.0.12 (Dependency) - marked-terminal 7.3.0 (Dependency) - ora 9.4.1 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile 4.1.2 (Dependency) - satori 0.12.2 (Dependency) - shlex 3.0.0 (Dependency) - simple-git 3.36.0 (Dependency) - smol-toml 1.7.0 (Dependency) - unbash 4.0.5 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.0 (Dependency) - yaml 2.9.0 (Dependency) - yoga-wasm-web ^0.3.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @phnx-labs/agents-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.22.103 - **License:** FSL-1.1-Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-12T16:57:48.913Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T00:08:52.027Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-20T08:10:01.036Z - **Known versions:** 132 - **Latest version:** 1.23.43 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** One CLI for all your AI coding agents - versions, config, cloud dispatch, sessions, and teams (now with first-class Grok Build CLI support) - **Author:** Phoenix Labs - **Maintainers:** swarmify, themuqsit - **Keywords:** agents, cli, dotfiles, claude, codex, cursor, opencode, grok, xai, mcp, skills, ai - **Runtime engines:** npm: \>=9, node: \>=22.5.0 - **Artifact files:** 1730 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 17,879,061 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()