--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/v/1.22.33" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/v/1.22.33.md" package: "@phnx-labs/agents-cli" report_status: "published" title: "@phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.33 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.22.33" --- # @phnx-labs/agents-cli@1.22.33 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 1.22.33 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The installer creates agents-cli shims and can self-heal PATH/long-running package services. On macOS, ordinary CLI startup can install a first-party LaunchAgent for its menu-bar helper; no foreign AI-agent configuration overwrite was confirmed. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 87.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-08T04:41:06.911Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-08T04:41:56.694Z - **Download time:** 1008 ms - **Static scan time:** 9252 ms - **AI review time:** 39519 ms - **Total time:** 49783 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The installer creates agents-cli shims and can self-heal PATH/long-running package services. On macOS, ordinary CLI startup can install a first-party LaunchAgent for its menu-bar helper; no foreign AI-agent configuration overwrite was confirmed. - **Trigger:** npm install (postinstall), then normal agents CLI invocation on macOS - **Impact:** Persistent user-level agents-cli helpers and PATH changes; no confirmed data-exfiltration chain. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/install-helper.js, dist/index.js, dist/lib/menubar/install-menubar.js, dist/lib/state.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-08T04:41:56.694Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** first-party CLI shims, service repair, and menu-bar persistence - **Rationale:** The package has meaningful install/runtime persistence and unprompted PATH self-healing, so it warrants warning. Inspected code scopes these actions to agents-cli-owned paths and exposes opt-outs; no concrete malicious behavior was established. - **Files touched:** ~/.agents/, ~/.agents/.cache/shims/, ~/.local/bin/agents, ~/.local/bin/ag, ~/.bash\_profile, ~/.profile, ~/Library/Application Support/agents-cli/Agents CLI.app, ~/Library/Application Support/agents-cli/MenubarHelper.app, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.phnx-labs.agents-menubar.plist - **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/latest, https://registry.npmjs.org/@phnx-labs/agents-cli/, https://unpkg.com/@phnx-labs/agents-cli@ ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 87.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js at install., scripts/postinstall.js writes ~/.agents/.cache/shims and may add ~/.local/bin to ~/.bash\_profile or ~/.profile without a prompt., On macOS postinstall copies a bundled Keychain app and can stop/restart its existing daemon/broker., dist/index.js auto-installs a signed menu-bar LaunchAgent on macOS during normal CLI startup. - **Evidence against:** Shell-rc mutation via AGENTS\_INIT\_SHELL is explicitly opt-in; interactive PATH addition asks first., LaunchAgent and daemon paths are first-party agents-cli components with a user disable sentinel., No source evidence of credential harvesting or exfiltration was found in inspected lifecycle files., Runtime update traffic is limited to package-aligned npm registry and unpkg endpoints. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/secrets.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 175 matchedText = const va...th); ``` ### 6. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L563: if (answer === 'now') { L564: const { spawnSync } = await import('child_process'); L565: let spinner = ora('Resolving package metadata...').start(); ``` ### 7. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/monitors/sources/command.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: * command on an interval — the evaluation is identical, so poll.ts delegates L6: * here. No agent, no sandbox: a plain `/bin/sh -c` (or `cmd /c` on Windows). L7: */ ``` ### 8. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/sqlite.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L15: const isBun = typeof globalThis.Bun !== 'undefined'; L16: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L17: // node:sqlite emits a process-level ExperimentalWarning the first time it loads. ``` ### 9. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/platform/ipc.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12: * touching disk, and never probe the result with fs.existsSync (it always reports L13: * false). Both forms are accepted by net.createServer / net.createConnection. L14: */ L15: export function ipcEndpoint(socketPath, platform = process.platform) { L16: if (platform === 'win32') { ``` ### 10. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 11. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 12. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/agents.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: */ L12: import { execFile } from 'child_process'; L13: import { promisify } from 'util'; ... L27: const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); L28: const HOME = os.homedir(); L29: /** ... L42: try { L43: cliVersionCache = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(CLI_VERSION_CACHE_PATH, 'utf-8')); L44: } ... L111: export function findInPath(command, options = {}) { L112: const pathEnv = process.env.PATH || ''; L113: const pathExt = process.platform === 'win32' ? (process.env.PATHEXT || '').split(';') : ['']; ``` ### 13. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 14. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/auto-dispatch-linear.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: */ L14: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L15: const LINEAR_API = 'https://api.linear.app/graphql'; L16: /** Resolve the Linear API key from env or (on macOS) the keychain. Null if absent. */ L17: export function resolveLinearApiKey() { L18: const fromEnv = process.env.LINEAR_API_KEY?.trim(); L19: if (fromEnv) ``` ### 15. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/auto-dispatch-linear.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: */ L14: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L15: const LINEAR_API = 'https://api.linear.app/graphql'; L16: /** Resolve the Linear API key from env or (on macOS) the keychain. Null if absent. */ L17: export function resolveLinearApiKey() { L18: const fromEnv = process.env.LINEAR_API_KEY?.trim(); L19: if (fromEnv) L20: return fromEnv; L21: if (process.platform === 'darwin') { L22: try { ... L40: headers: { Authorization: apiKey, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, L41: body: JSON.stringify({ query, variables }), ``` ### 16. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/state.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L3: * L4: * Single root at ~/.agents/ with three internal buckets: L5: * L6: * ~/.agents/ — user repo: user-authored resources + agents.yaml L7: * (git-tracked via `agents repo push`). L8: * ~/.agents/.system/ — system repo: npm-shipped resources, regenerable. L9: * Don't hand-edit; maintained by npm install / L10: * `agents repo pull system`. L11: * ~/.agents/.history/ — durable runtime data (sessions, versions, runs, L12: * teams/agents, trash, backups). Backed up by L13: * `agents repo push`. L14: * ~/.agents/.cache/ — regenerable runtime data (shims, packages, helpers W ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/menubar/install-menubar.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/lib/menubar/install-menubar.js L17: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; L18: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L19: import * as fs from 'fs'; ... L45: function onDarwin() { L46: return process.platform === 'darwin'; L47: } ... L49: function installDir() { L50: return path.join(os.homedir(), 'Library', 'Application Support', INSTALL_DIR_NAME); L51: } ... L204: }); L205: const out = `${r.stderr || ''}${r.stdout || ''}`; L206: const team = out.match(/TeamIdentifier=([A-Z0-9]+)/)?.[1]; ``` ### 18. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 19. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 20. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/agents - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/bin/agents kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 74528720 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/menubar/MenubarHelper.app/Contents/Resources/AppIcon.icns - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/lib/menubar/MenubarHelper.app/Contents/Resources/AppIcon.icns kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 80744 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 23. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/acp/client.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare - **Dependencies:** 22 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 9 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 22 ### Published dependency entries - @homebridge/node-pty-prebuilt-multiarch 0.13.1 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts 8.5.2 (Dependency) - @types/proper-lockfile 4.1.4 (Dependency) - @xterm/headless 6.0.0 (Dependency) - @zed-industries/agent-client-protocol 0.4.5 (Dependency) - acorn 8.18.0 (Dependency) - age-encryption 0.3.0 (Dependency) - chalk 5.6.2 (Dependency) - commander 15.0.0 (Dependency) - croner 10.0.1 (Dependency) - diff 9.0.0 (Dependency) - lru-cache 11.5.2 (Dependency) - marked 15.0.12 (Dependency) - marked-terminal 7.3.0 (Dependency) - ora 9.4.1 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile 4.1.2 (Dependency) - shlex 3.0.0 (Dependency) - simple-git 3.36.0 (Dependency) - smol-toml 1.7.0 (Dependency) - unbash 4.0.5 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.0 (Dependency) - yaml 2.9.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @phnx-labs/agents-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.22.33 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-08-08T04:27:52.613Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T00:08:52.027Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-30T23:02:20.630Z - **Known versions:** 54 - **Latest version:** 1.22.66 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** One CLI for all your AI coding agents - versions, config, cloud dispatch, sessions, and teams (now with first-class Grok Build CLI support) - **Author:** Phoenix Labs - **Maintainers:** swarmify, themuqsit - **Keywords:** agents, cli, dotfiles, claude, codex, cursor, opencode, grok, xai, mcp, skills, ai - **Runtime engines:** npm: \>=9, node: \>=22.5.0 - **Artifact files:** 1379 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 93,635,564 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()