registry  /  @pimmesz/afterburner  /  2.16.0

@pimmesz/afterburner@2.16.0

Convert idle AI-subscription quota (Claude or Codex) into shippable engineering work: budget-aware trigger, bounded task selection, PR-only output.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface is established. The risky primitives are user-invoked features of an AI-agent automation CLI, not install-time or import-time behavior.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs afterburner CLI commands such as auth, init, run-once, schedule, notify, update, or watch.
Impact
Can spend AI quota and modify configured repositories when explicitly run live; no hidden credential harvesting or unauthorized exfiltration found.
Mechanism
User-configured AI-agent orchestration, scheduler installation, notifications, and update helper.
Rationale
Static inspection shows a potentially dangerous but openly documented CLI for running local AI agents on user-configured repos, with no lifecycle execution, hidden payload, or unconsented exfiltration. Scanner findings map to package-aligned commands and explicit setup flows rather than malware.
Evidence
package.jsonREADME.mdskill/SKILL.mddist/cli/index.jsdist/chunk-46LFIFRK.jsafterburner.config.mjs.afterburner/backlog.jsonl~/.claude.json~/.zshrc~/.bashrclaunchd/systemd/schtasks scheduler entries
Network endpoints3
registry.npmjs.orgapi.telegram.orgntfy.sh

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/chunk-46LFIFRK.js builds live invocations for claude/codex with shell-capable agents.
  • dist/chunk-46LFIFRK.js can temporarily write ~/.claude.json trust state for a worktree during Claude runs.
  • dist/cli/index.js has user-invoked schedule/statusline/update commands that write scheduler files, shell rc, or run package-manager update commands.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; execution is via CLI bin or import only.
  • README.md describes the package purpose as user-configured AI-agent PR automation and documents live-agent risks.
  • dist/chunk-46LFIFRK.js passes untrusted task text via stdin/env, disables naive git push for child agent, and commits to afterburner branches.
  • Network calls are package-aligned: npm registry update checks, Telegram/ntfy notifications, and user repo/git/gh workflows.
  • dist/cli/index.js auth command stores a Claude token only after explicit user action and redacts token output.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 4 file(s), 414 KB of source, external domains: api.telegram.org, crontab.guru, git-scm.com, github.com, nodejs.org, ntfy.sh, registry.npmjs.org, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source
dist/cli/index.jsView file
70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
70Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli/index.js L70: L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
326// src/cli/commands/auth.ts L327: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L328: import { createInterface } from "readline";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L326
3084if (platform === "win32") { L3085: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3086: }
High
Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3084
3084if (platform === "win32") { L3085: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3086: } ... L3094: function checkNtfy(config) { L3095: const hasToken = !!process.env.AFTERBURNER_NTFY_TOKEN; L3096: const server = config.notify.ntfy.server; L3097: if (hasToken && !server.startsWith("https://")) { L3098: return {
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3084
2943const results = []; L2944: const version = spawnSync("claude", ["--version"], { encoding: "utf8" }); L2945: if (version.status !== 0) { ... L2949: detail: "claude-code engine selected but the `claude` CLI is not on PATH", L2950: fix: "Install Claude Code: `npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code`, then run `claude /login`." L2951: });
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L2943
70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Medium
Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli/index.js
HighChild Processdist/cli/index.js
HighShelldist/cli/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/cli/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli/index.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings