registry  /  @pimmesz/afterburner  /  2.17.0

@pimmesz/afterburner@2.17.0

Convert idle AI-subscription quota (Claude or Codex) into shippable engineering work: budget-aware trigger, bounded task selection, PR-only output.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was found. High-risk primitives are part of a user-invoked AI quota automation CLI that creates isolated worktrees, runs configured agents, and optionally notifies or updates when commanded.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs afterburner CLI commands such as auth, run-once, watch, schedule, notify, review, or update.
Impact
Can modify configured repositories and local Afterburner/Claude scheduler/config files by design, but no hidden install-time execution or unconsented exfiltration was confirmed.
Mechanism
User-invoked AI-agent automation and notification workflow
Rationale
Static inspection confirms the scanner-highlighted shell, network, token, and package-manager behavior is reachable only through explicit CLI workflows and is aligned with the package's stated purpose. There is no lifecycle execution, hidden import-time payload, credential harvesting, or command-output exfiltration beyond configured/user-invoked notification and repository automation paths.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli/index.jsdist/core/index.jsdist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.js
Network endpoints3
ntfy.shapi.telegram.orgregistry.npmjs.org

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/cli/index.js imports child_process and exposes commands that spawn claude/codex/git/gh and update via package manager when user invokes them.
  • dist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.js can write Claude config trust state for temporary worktrees and can commit/push/merge generated branches under configured policies.
  • dist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.js sends optional notifications to ntfy.sh or api.telegram.org with env-provided tokens.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall/preinstall lifecycle scripts; bin execution is user-invoked.
  • dist/cli/index.js defaultSpawnSetupToken runs `claude setup-token`, redacts stdout, extracts token, and stores it locally via writeOAuthToken rather than sending command output externally.
  • Network calls are package-aligned: npm update checks, Telegram/ntfy notifications, and configured repo/PR operations.
  • Agent prompts explicitly label task, issue, rejected, and merged text as untrusted and pass it through env vars rather than shell interpolation.
  • dist/core/index.js only re-exports library APIs and has no obvious import-time execution beyond module loading.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 4 file(s), 419 KB of source, external domains: api.telegram.org, crontab.guru, git-scm.com, github.com, nodejs.org, ntfy.sh, registry.npmjs.org, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source
dist/cli/index.jsView file
70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
70Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli/index.js L70: L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
326// src/cli/commands/auth.ts L327: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L328: import { createInterface } from "readline";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L326
3084if (platform === "win32") { L3085: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3086: }
High
Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3084
3084if (platform === "win32") { L3085: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3086: } ... L3094: function checkNtfy(config) { L3095: const hasToken = !!process.env.AFTERBURNER_NTFY_TOKEN; L3096: const server = config.notify.ntfy.server; L3097: if (hasToken && !server.startsWith("https://")) { L3098: return {
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3084
2943const results = []; L2944: const version = spawnSync("claude", ["--version"], { encoding: "utf8" }); L2945: if (version.status !== 0) { ... L2949: detail: "claude-code engine selected but the `claude` CLI is not on PATH", L2950: fix: "Install Claude Code: `npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code`, then run `claude /login`." L2951: });
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L2943
70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
Medium
Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
dist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.jsView file
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @pimmesz/afterburner@2.16.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QHBpbW1lc3ovYWZ0ZXJidXJuZXI:2.16.0 similarity = 0.750 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version.

dist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.jsView on unpkg

Findings

3 Critical4 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-WJGGV2YJ.js
HighChild Processdist/cli/index.js
HighShelldist/cli/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/cli/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli/index.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings