registry  /  @pimmesz/afterburner  /  2.18.0

@pimmesz/afterburner@2.18.0

Convert idle AI-subscription quota (Claude or Codex) into shippable engineering work: budget-aware trigger, bounded task selection, PR-only output.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was found. The risky primitives are package-aligned automation features gated behind explicit CLI/config use, not install-time or import-time behavior.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs afterburner CLI commands such as auth, run-once, watch, notify, schedule, or update.
Impact
Can modify configured repositories through isolated worktrees/branches and send configured run notifications; no evidence of covert credential harvesting or exfiltration.
Mechanism
User-invoked AI agent orchestration, notifications, schedule/config writes, and explicit update command
Rationale
Static inspection shows a legitimate AI automation CLI with dangerous-but-expected user-invoked capabilities, explicit configuration gates, local token storage, and package-aligned network use. There is no lifecycle execution, covert exfiltration, persistence, destructive payload, dependency confusion, or unconsented agent control-surface mutation.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli/index.jsdist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.jsdist/core/index.jsskill/SKILL.md.env.exampleafterburner.config.example.tsREADME.md
Network endpoints3
ntfy.shapi.telegram.orgregistry.npmjs.org

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
    Evidence against
    • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; CLI bins are user-invoked dist/cli/index.js
    • dist/cli/index.js defaultSpawnSetupToken runs `claude setup-token` only from auth flow and masks token in console output before storing locally
    • dist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.js spawns `claude`/`codex`, git, gh, and configured verify/setup commands as the core AI PR automation feature
    • dist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.js sends notifications only to configured ntfy/Telegram endpoints and drops tokens for non-HTTPS ntfy/Telegram APIs
    • dist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.js strips ANTHROPIC/OpenAI/Codex API keys from agent env and treats task/issue text as untrusted env data
    • dist/cli/index.js update command is explicit user action; registry URL is validated for shell-unsafe characters before shell execution
    Behavioral surface
    Source
    ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
    Supply chain
    HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
    ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
    scanned 4 file(s), 430 KB of source, external domains: afterburner.run, api.telegram.org, crontab.guru, git-scm.com, github.com, nodejs.org, ntfy.sh, registry.npmjs.org, www.apple.com

    Source & flagged code

    8 flagged · loading source
    dist/cli/index.jsView file
    70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
    Critical
    Command Output Exfiltration

    Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
    70Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli/index.js L70: L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
    Critical
    Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

    A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
    326// src/cli/commands/auth.ts L327: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L328: import { createInterface } from "readline";
    High
    Child Process

    Package source references child process execution.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L326
    3149if (platform === "win32") { L3150: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3151: }
    High
    Shell

    Package source references shell execution.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3149
    3149if (platform === "win32") { L3150: return { name: "notify", ok: true, detail: "desktop banners via PowerShell toast" }; L3151: } ... L3159: function checkNtfy(config) { L3160: const hasToken = !!process.env.AFTERBURNER_NTFY_TOKEN; L3161: const server = config.notify.ntfy.server; L3162: if (hasToken && !server.startsWith("https://")) { L3163: return {
    High
    Same File Env Network Execution

    A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3149
    3008const results = []; L3009: const version = spawnSync("claude", ["--version"], { encoding: "utf8" }); L3010: if (version.status !== 0) { ... L3014: detail: "claude-code engine selected but the `claude` CLI is not on PATH", L3015: fix: "Install Claude Code: `npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code`, then run `claude /login`." L3016: });
    High
    Runtime Package Install

    Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L3008
    70L71: // package.json L72: var package_default = { ... L117: type: "git", L118: url: "git+https://github.com/pimmesz/afterburner.git" L119: }, ... L156: // src/cli/ui.ts L157: var noColor = !!process.env.NO_COLOR || process.env.TERM === "dumb"; L158: var fancy = process.stdout.isTTY === true && !noColor; L159: var fancyErr = process.stderr.isTTY === true && !noColor; L160: var canAnimate = fancyErr && !process.env.CI; L161: var paint = (enabled) => (open2, close) => (s) => enabled ? `\x1B[${open2}m${s}\x1B[${close}m` : s;
    Medium
    Install Persistence

    Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

    dist/cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L70
    dist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.jsView file
    matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @pimmesz/afterburner@2.17.1 matchedIdentity = npm:QHBpbW1lc3ovYWZ0ZXJidXJuZXI:2.17.1 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
    Critical
    Previous Version Dangerous Delta

    This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

    dist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.jsView on unpkg

    Findings

    3 Critical4 High4 Medium4 Low
    CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli/index.js
    CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli/index.js
    CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-KUBWWM7W.js
    HighChild Processdist/cli/index.js
    HighShelldist/cli/index.js
    HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli/index.js
    HighRuntime Package Installdist/cli/index.js
    MediumNetwork
    MediumEnvironment Vars
    MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli/index.js
    MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
    LowScripts Present
    LowFilesystem
    LowHigh Entropy Strings
    LowUrl Strings