@pisell/pisellos@2.2.316
一个可扩展的前端模块化SDK框架，支持插件系统
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms default, automatic disclosure of application context and customer-related operation data to a package-selected webhook. The configurable logger does not gate the default transfer on consent, so this is concrete data exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Initializing ScanOrder and using its logged operations, including customer-login handling, when no logger configuration is supplied.
Impact
Application and customer-related operational data is disclosed to the webhook recipient.
Mechanism
The logger serializes record context and payloads, then posts them to the package-selected Feishu webhook without a consent gate.
Attack narrative
ScanOrder defaults to a package-specified Feishu webhook and logs during initialization and customer-related activity. The logger includes host and cache context plus operation payloads, then posts the records to that webhook without requiring recipient-specific consent.
AI rationale
Source confirms default, automatic disclosure of application context and customer-related operation data to a package-selected webhook. The configurable logger does not gate the default transfer on consent, so this is concrete data exfiltration.
Evidence
dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jsdist/modules/ScanOrderLogger/index.jsdist/modules/ScanOrderLogger/providers/feishu.js
Network endpoints1
open.feishu.cn
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 95.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- ScanOrder initialization defaults to Feishu logging and a package-specified webhook on open.feishu.cn when no logger configuration is supplied.
- The logger sends the current host, cache identifier, and operation payload in its log records; a customer-login record includes the customer ID.
- The Feishu provider posts the serialized log records to the configured webhook.
- ScanOrder logs during initialization and on customer-login activity, with no consent gate on these sends.
Evidence against
- The logger configuration can be overridden by the caller, but the package selects its fixed webhook by default when no configuration is supplied.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsEvalNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcedist/plugins/window.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @pisell/pisellos@2.3.168
matchedPath = dist/plugins/window.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHBpc2VsbC9waXNlbGxvcw:2.3.168
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg248} else {
L249: eval(handler);
L250: }
Low
Eval
Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg · L248dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jsView file
•Default hardcoded logging webhook in dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js:
this.store.scanOrderLogger.setProviderConfig(((_this$otherParams5 = this.otherParams) === null || _this$otherParams5 === void 0 ? void 0 : _this$otherParams5.scanOrderLoggerConfig)...
webhook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/216b3fe6-af98-424e-8706-f0471241a7ed',
errorHook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/015b7c2a-dd3c-4c30-9898-ef0f5253111f'
Rich runtime records posted to the webhook in [redacted].js:
var context = record.context || {};
text: "\u65E5\u5FD7\u5185\u5BB9: ".concat(safeStringify(record.payload), "\n")
text: "\u6269\u5C55\u4FE1\u606F: ".concat(safeStringify(record.extra), "\n")
return fetch(webhook, {
Reachable runtime logger calls in dist/modules/Order/index.js:
this.logger.addL
Findings
1 Critical3 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedlib/solution/RegisterAndLogin/utils.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/plugins/window.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturelib/modules/AccountList/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/plugins/window.js
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @pisell/pisellos@2.2.316.
See all versions of @pisell/pisellos for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @pisell/pisellos@2.2.316. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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