registry / @ploomescrm/bridge / 1.1.1

@ploomescrm/bridge@1.1.1

Bridge de comunicação tipado e **agnóstico de transporte** entre uma aplicação host e os apps que ela embute — um `<iframe>` no web, uma `<WebView>` no mobile.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installation mutates the consuming project's Claude Code control surface without an explicit user setup command. It installs a skill and can install agent, command, and output-style content from package-controlled files.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

npm postinstall when installed as a dependency

Impact

A package install can activate package-supplied Claude Code instructions and extensions in the consumer project.

Mechanism

postinstall copies package-controlled AI extensions into consumer .claude and rewrites .claude/CLAUDE.md

Policy narrative

On npm postinstall, scripts/setup.mjs identifies the consumer root via INIT_CWD, copies package-controlled AI extension categories into .claude, deletes prior prefixed entries, and adds a generated import to .claude/CLAUDE.md. This is unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface; no separate network or credential-exfiltration chain was found.

Rationale

The package performs a concrete, automatic postinstall mutation of the consuming project's broad Claude Code extension and instruction directories. This meets the blocking policy even though the current extension text appears package-aligned and no exfiltration was found.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/setup.mjsai-extensions/CLAUDE.mdai-extensions/skills/use-bridge/SKILL.mddist/index.mjsdist/index.cjsai-extensions/skills/use-bridge/<consumer-project>/.claude/CLAUDE.md

@ploomescrm/bridge@1.1.1

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code