@pmate/cli@0.29.9
CLI utilities for the pMate project
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is a first-party pmate CLI with no install-time attack, but command handlers forward the saved session token to an unrestricted operator-configured base URL. That conditional credential exposure is a dangerous capability, not a hidden exfiltration payload.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The published bin and main entry are dist/index.js. package.json has a prepare build script and no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Command handlers load the saved pmate session token and send it as a Bearer token to a base URL taken from a CLI flag or environment variable, falling back to a pmate host, with no host allowlist before fetch.
- main() runs only when dist/index.js is the process entrypoint, so importing the package does not start those requests.
- Defaults point at first-party pmate.chat APIs and the send path is a user-run CLI command.
- No eval, remote payload fetch, install-time agent-config writes, or self-dependency lifecycle chain was found.
- The session file is stored under the user home .pmate directory with mode 0600.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L90A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L90Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @pmate/cli@0.29.9.
See all versions of @pmate/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @pmate/cli@0.29.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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