@pmate/cli@0.45.0
CLI utilities for the pMate project
AI Security Review
scanned 18h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe new Electron template exposes unrestricted local process execution to a trusted renderer after login, without an approval step for each command. This presents a real agent capability risk, but I found no evidence of automatic execution or credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The Electron bridge is enabled only for the `pmate:merry` app and checks requests against a trusted renderer.
- After login, the bridge accepts `local.exec` requests and runs the supplied command and arguments on the local machine.
- The executor uses `execFile` without a shell, but returns command output to the caller and has no per-command confirmation.
- The manifest declares no install lifecycle scripts; the CLI entry point is a bin and main, and execution is guarded by `require.main === module`.
- The GitHub helper removes inherited `GH_TOKEN` and resolves a token only when a repository config names a GitHub user.
- The OpenAI client uses the configured API key and optional configured base URL; the source does not show a fixed credential redirection.
Source & flagged code
11 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L90A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L90Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @pmate/cli@0.45.0.
See all versions of @pmate/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @pmate/cli@0.45.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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