@prefactor/cli@0.5.0
Prefactor command-line interface
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe user-triggered login flow sends the machine hostname to Prefactor's service as client information without disclosing that collection. This is an identifying telemetry privacy risk, but the source shows no unrelated collection or credential theft.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The user runs the CLI's login command.
Impact
The service receives a machine identifier as part of the login flow, creating an undisclosed privacy risk.
Mechanism
The CLI reads the OS hostname, truncates it to 64 characters, and includes it in JSON posted to /cli/login/start.
AI rationale
The user-triggered login flow sends the machine hostname to Prefactor's service as client information without disclosing that collection. This is an identifying telemetry privacy risk, but the source shows no unrelated collection or credential theft.
Evidence
dist/bin/cli.cjs
Network endpoints1
app.prefactorai.com/cli/login/start
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI's login command collects the machine hostname and includes it in client information.
- When login starts, the CLI sends that information in a POST request to the configured Prefactor service's /cli/login/start endpoint.
- The hostname is truncated to 64 characters before it is sent.
Evidence against
- The hostname is sent only during the user-invoked login flow, not on package installation or import.
- The default destination is Prefactor's own service, and login is the CLI's stated purpose.
- No credential theft or unrelated process execution was identified.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/install/platform.jsView file
1import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L2: function normalizePlatform(platform) {
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/install/platform.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/bin/cli.cjsView file
495Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/bin/cli.cjs spawns dist/bin/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L495: var import_commander8 = require("commander");
L496: // packages/cli/package.json
L497: var package_default = {
...
L526: type: "git",
L527: url: "git+https://github.com/prefactordev/typescript-sdk.git",
L528: directory: "packages/cli"
...
L558: method: "PUT",
L559: body: { details }
L560: });
...
L694: async function findConfigPath() {
L695: const directoryRoot = await findDirectoryRoot(process.cwd());
L696: const directoryRootConfigPath = import_node_path.resolve(directoryRoot, CONFIG_FILENAME);
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/bin/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L495Findings
1 Critical2 High4 Medium3 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.cjs
HighChild Processdist/install/platform.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/bin/cli.cjs
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/bin/cli.cjs
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/bin/cli.cjs
MediumAi Review Evidencedist/bin/cli.cjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @prefactor/cli@0.5.0.
See all versions of @prefactor/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @prefactor/cli@0.5.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.