@proagentstore/cli@0.4.102
CLI for creating, publishing, and running ProAgentStore agents
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install hook or covert attack chain, so the source does not support blocking it as malware. Its authenticated coding workflow nevertheless launches local agents with broad default permissions, warranting a warning for dangerous capability.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a CLI and has no install lifecycle scripts.
- The user-invoked `up` command starts the runner and connects it to the ProAgentStore service.
- The runner requires authorization for requests, and its coding-start route passes requests to the coding runtime.
- The coding runtime starts a local session in a configured working directory using request-supplied settings.
- Default Claude, Gemini, and Codex commands bypass permission checks or use full-access mode; the runner spawns the selected command locally.
- No automatic install-time execution or unguarded coding-start route was found.
- The coding capability requires a user to start the runner and an authorized request to reach its local server.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/browser-runner/local-artifact/runtime.jsView on unpkg · L22This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/index.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @proagentstore/cli@0.4.102.
See all versions of @proagentstore/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @proagentstore/cli@0.4.102 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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