@proagentstore/cli@0.4.156
CLI for creating, publishing, and running ProAgentStore agents
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows that the refresh path reuses a saved session token and sends it to an API base configurable through PAGS_API_BASE. This conditional credential exposure warrants a warning.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user runs `pags up` with PAGS_API_BASE set, and the saved session is due for refresh.
Impact
The configured recipient could receive the user's ProAgentStore session token.
Mechanism
The runner reads the saved token and sends it in a Bearer header to the configured API base, without restricting the destination host.
AI rationale
The source shows that the refresh path reuses a saved session token and sends it to an API base configurable through PAGS_API_BASE. This conditional credential exposure warrants a warning.
Evidence
dist/index.js
Network endpoints1
api.proagentstore.online
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- When no token is supplied, the helper can fall back to the saved session token.
- The API base can come from PAGS_API_BASE and otherwise defaults to api.proagentstore.online.
- The refresh path supplies the existing session token and sends it as a Bearer credential to the selected API base.
- The ordinary initial instance lookup sends the session token to api.proagentstore.online.
Evidence against
- The default recipient is the ProAgentStore API; exposure depends on configuring a different base.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/browser-runner/site-builder/runtime.jsView file
32*/
L33: import { spawn as nodeSpawn } from "node:child_process";
L34: import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/browser-runner/site-builder/runtime.jsView on unpkg · L32dist/index.jsView file
1463if (restarter === "command") {
L1464: deps.spawn(process.env[RESTART_COMMAND_ENV], { shell: true, detached: true, stdio: "ignore", env: process.env }).unref();
L1465: deps.exit(0);
High
383// src/commands/login.ts
L384: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L385: import { existsSync as existsSync3, mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync2, unlinkSync, writeFileSync as writeFileSync2 } from "fs";
L386: import { createServer } from "http";
L387: import { homedir, hostname } from "os";
...
L391: // src/commands/login-device.ts
L392: function chooseLoginFlow(opts, env = process.env, platform = process.platform) {
L393: if (opts.device) return { flow: "device", why: "--device" };
Findings
1 Critical6 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/browser-runner/coding/runtime.js
HighChild Processdist/browser-runner/site-builder/runtime.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/browser-runner/coding/repo.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/browser-runner/coding/runtime.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/index.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @proagentstore/cli@0.4.156.
See all versions of @proagentstore/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @proagentstore/cli@0.4.156 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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