@proagentstore/cli@0.4.210
CLI for creating, publishing, and running ProAgentStore agents
AI Security Review
scanned 18h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged execution, network, and persistence behaviors serve the CLI’s agent, browser, and runner functions. The reviewed provider keys stay with their matching provider, and no install-time hook or unsolicited persistence was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook; its scripts are build, development, typecheck, and package smoke-test commands.
- Provider API keys are used for model-list requests to their matching provider endpoints, and the code returns model IDs rather than forwarding the keys.
- Local application runs use a run-specific bridge; API-key authentication is refused for that workflow, and named sign-in secrets are scoped to the paused run’s browser session.
- Service persistence is behind the explicit `pags up --install-service` option and requires an existing sign-in.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/browser-runner/site-builder/runtime.jsView on unpkg · L32Package source references shell execution.
dist/browser-runner/coding/windows-runner-live.jsView on unpkg · L59Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @proagentstore/cli@0.4.210.
See all versions of @proagentstore/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @proagentstore/cli@0.4.210 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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