--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@promptctl/cc-candybar/v/1.157.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@promptctl/cc-candybar/v/1.157.0.md" package: "@promptctl/cc-candybar" report_status: "published" title: "@promptctl/cc-candybar@1.157.0 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "1.157.0" --- # @promptctl/cc-candybar@1.157.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 19 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 1.157.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The manifest declares no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected runtime network behavior is consistent with package update and pricing features. Scanner indicators alone do not establish credential exfiltration or malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-26T23:41:59.378Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-26T23:42:37.668Z - **Download time:** 1015 ms - **Static scan time:** 2077 ms - **AI review time:** 35196 ms - **Total time:** 38290 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No attack was identified in the inspected package sources. The observed network and process behavior supports the CLI’s pricing, update, and native-render functions. - **Trigger:** CLI use, including the explicit install command or an update check during runtime. - **Impact:** No credential disclosure, unconsented install-time mutation, or other concrete harmful effect was established. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-26T23:42:37.668Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI updates its settings during installation, checks for package updates, and retrieves pricing data from project-hosted sources. - **Rationale:** The manifest declares no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected runtime network behavior is consistent with package update and pricing features. Scanner indicators alone do not establish credential exfiltration or malicious behavior. - **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/promptctl/cc-candybar/main/pricing.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json lists only a prepublishOnly script, which runs checks and builds; no install hook is declared., The bundle exposes installation as a named command and updates Claude settings through that installation flow., The updater applies an available update only through its apply action; pricing data is fetched from the project’s GitHub repository., The inspected optional platform-package manifests contain no lifecycle scripts and describe prebuilt native render binaries. - **Evidence against:** Scanner hints flag network, environment access, and child-process use, but inspected examples align with pricing retrieval, update checks, and the package’s CLI behavior; no credential transfer or attack was established. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @promptctl/cc-candybar@1.157.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @promptctl/cc-candybar@1.157.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import t from"node:process";import{URL as n,URLSearchParams as r,fileURLToPath as i,pathToFileURL as a}from"node:url";import{json as o}f... L3: `)}function k(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||Array.isArray(e))return;let t=e,n=It.filter(e=>t[e]!==void 0);return n.every(e=>typeof t[e]==`string`&&t[e]!==``)?Object.fromEntries(n.m... ``` ### 4. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import t from"node:process";import{URL as n,URLSearchParams as r,fileURLToPath as i,pathToFileURL as a}from"node:url";import{json as o}f... L3: `)}function k(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||Array.isArray(e))return;let t=e,n=It.filter(e=>t[e]!==void 0);return n.every(e=>typeof t[e]==`string`&&t[e]!==``)?Object.fromEntries(n.m... L4: `)}const Un=`/usr/bin/footprint`;function Wn(e,t){return e===`darwin`?[Jn(Un,[`-p`,String(t)]),Jn(`/usr/bin/vmmap`,[`--summary`,String(t)])]:e===`linux`?[Yn(`/proc/self/smaps_rollu... L5: `).map(e=>e.trim()).find(e=>e.length>0);return t===void 0?``:` (${t})`}const Zn=`CC_CANDYBAR_RSS_LIMIT_MB`;function Qn(e){let t=e[Zn];if(t===void 0)return 1024;let n=/^\d+$/.test(t... L6: `)}catch(e){t.stderr ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L480: `)+1,a=0,o=0;for(let e of n.slice(r,i).split(` L481: `)){let t=MG(e);t.kind!==`blank`&&(a++,t.kind===`unparsed`&&o++)}return{lines:a,unparsed:o,whole:t}}function U1(e){let t=Ka(e,BM+1);return t.kind===`ok`?P(H1(t.value.buf,t.value.fr... L482: `)};return e.error===null?{...t,kind:`loaded`,unused:e.unused}:{...t,kind:`failed`,error:e.error}}const Y1=e=>D1(()=>io(e));function X1(e,t){let n=e=>JSON.stringify([e.managedDir,e... ... L495: `).map(e=>e.trim().split(` `)).filter(([,e])=>e===t).map(([e])=>e)}const l6=/(^|\/)(cc-attach|bun-attach\.js)(\s|$)/;function u6(e,t,n){for(let r of M$(j$(e),t)){if(r.command.split... L496: `);async function f6(e){if(process.platform===`linux`)return{executable:await p.promises.readlink(`/proc/${e}/exe`),argv:(await p.promises.readFile(`/proc/${e}/cmdline ``` ### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import t from"node:process";import{URL as n,URLSearchParams as r,fileURLToPath as i,pathToFileURL as a}from"node:url";import{json as o}f... L3: `)}function k(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||Array.isArray(e))return;let t=e,n=It.filter(e=>t[e]!==void 0);return n.every(e=>typeof t[e]==`string`&&t[e]!==``)?Object.fromEntries(n.m... L4: `)}const Un=`/usr/bin/footprint`;function Wn(e,t){return e===`darwin`?[Jn(Un,[`-p`,String(t)]),Jn(`/usr/bin/vmmap`,[`--summary`,String(t)])]:e===`linux`?[Yn(`/proc/self/smaps_rollu... L5: `).map(e=>e.trim()).find(e=>e.length>0);return t===void 0?``:` (${t})`}const Zn=`CC_CANDYBAR_RSS_LIMIT_MB`;function Qn(e){let t=e[Zn];if(t===void 0)return 1024;let n=/^\d+$/.test(t... L6: `)}catch(e){t.stderr ``` ### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L480: `)+1,a=0,o=0;for(let e of n.slice(r,i).split(` L481: `)){let t=MG(e);t.kind!==`blank`&&(a++,t.kind===`unparsed`&&o++)}return{lines:a,unparsed:o,whole:t}}function U1(e){let t=Ka(e,BM+1);return t.kind===`ok`?P(H1(t.value.buf,t.value.fr... L482: `)};return e.error===null?{...t,kind:`loaded`,unused:e.unused}:{...t,kind:`failed`,error:e.error}}const Y1=e=>D1(()=>io(e));function X1(e,t){let n=e=>JSON.stringify([e.managedDir,e... L483: `);let i=l0(r.value);if(i!==null){t.stderr.write(`daemon-stats: ${i}\n`),t.exitCode=1;return}n||t.stdout.write(_0(r.value))}function c0(){return rn(()=>({kind:`stats`}),o0,e=>`stat... ... L495: `).map(e=>e.trim().split(` `)).filter(([,e])=>e===t).map(([e])=>e)}const l6=/(^|\/)(cc-attach|bun-attach\.js)(\s|$)/;function u6(e,t,n){for(let r of M$(j$(e),t)){if(r. ``` ### 11. Critical: Trojan Source Unicode - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L9: contains invisible/control Unicode U+200C (zero width non-joiner) `:case`\r`:case`\u2028`:case`\u2029`:b(),p=`default`;return;case void 0:return b(),x(`eof`)}b()},value(){switch(_){case`{`:case`[`:return x(`punctuator`,b());case`n`:return b(),S(`ull`),x(`null`,null);case`t`:return b(),S(`rue`),x(`boolean` ``` ### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.mjs L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import t from"node:process";import{URL as n,URLSearchParams as r,fileURLToPath as i,pathToFileURL as a}from"node:url";import{json as o}f... L3: `)}function k(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||Array.isArray(e))return;let t=e,n=It.filter(e=>t[e]!==void 0);return n.every(e=>typeof t[e]==`string`&&t[e]!==``)?Object.fromEntries(n.m... L4: `)}const Un=`/usr/bin/footprint`;function Wn(e,t){return e===`darwin`?[Jn(Un,[`-p`,String(t)]),Jn(`/usr/bin/vmmap`,[`--summary`,String(t)])]:e===`linux`?[Yn(`/proc/self/smaps_rollu... L5: `).map(e=>e.trim()).find(e=>e.length>0);return t===void 0?``:` (${t})`}const Zn=`CC_CANDYBAR_RSS_LIMIT_MB`;function Qn(e){let t=e[Zn];if(t===void 0)ret ``` ### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.mjs L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import{createRequire as e}from"node:module";import t from"node:process";import{URL as n,URLSearchParams as r,fileURLToPath as i,pathToFileURL as a}from"node:url";import{json as o}f... L3: `)}function k(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||Array.isArray(e))return;let t=e,n=It.filter(e=>t[e]!==void 0);return n.every(e=>typeof t[e]==`string`&&t[e]!==``)?Object.fromEntries(n.m... L4: `)}const Un=`/usr/bin/footprint`;function Wn(e,t){return e===`darwin`?[Jn(Un,[`-p`,String(t)]),Jn(`/usr/bin/vmmap`,[`--summary`,String(t)])]:e===`linux`?[Yn(`/proc/self/smaps_rollu... L5: `).map(e=>e.trim()).find(e=>e.length>0);return t===void 0?``:` (${t})`}const Zn=`CC_CANDYBAR_RSS_LIMIT_MB`;function Qn(e){let t ``` ### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.mjs L480: `)+1,a=0,o=0;for(let e of n.slice(r,i).split(` L481: `)){let t=MG(e);t.kind!==`blank`&&(a++,t.kind===`unparsed`&&o++)}return{lines:a,unparsed:o,whole:t}}function U1(e){let t=Ka(e,BM+1);return t.kind===`ok`?P(H1(t.value.buf,t.value.fr... L482: `)};return e.error===null?{...t,kind:`loaded`,unused:e.unused}:{...t,kind:`failed`,error:e.error}}const Y1=e=>D1(()=>io(e));function X1(e,t){let n=e=>JSON.stringify([e.managedDir,e... L483: `);let i=l0(r.value);if(i!==null){t.stderr.write(`daemon-stats: ${i}\n`),t.exitCode=1;return}n||t.stdout.write(_0(r.value))}function c0(){return rn(()=>({kind:`stats`}),o0,e=>`stat... ... L495: `).map(e=>e.trim().split(` `)).filter(([,e])=>e===t).map(([e])=>e)}const l6=/(^|\/ ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** plugin/bin/preview.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = plugin/bin/preview.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 6874 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 4 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 33 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4 ### Published dependency entries - @promptctl/cc-candybar-darwin-arm64 1.157.0 (OptionalDependency) - @promptctl/cc-candybar-darwin-x64 1.157.0 (OptionalDependency) - @promptctl/cc-candybar-linux-arm64 1.157.0 (OptionalDependency) - @promptctl/cc-candybar-linux-x64 1.157.0 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @promptctl/cc-candybar - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.157.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-26T23:39:31.643Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-03T12:41:01.931Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-03T18:03:26.680Z - **Known versions:** 242 - **Latest version:** 1.189.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Statusline renderer for Claude Code — a JSON5-configurable DSL with daemon-cached data sources, byte-clean palette-aware composition, and OSC8 click verbs. - **Author:** Brandon Fryslie - **Maintainers:** brandon-fryslie - **Keywords:** claude, powerline, statusline, typescript, claude-code - **Runtime engines:** node: ^20.19.0 || \>=22.12.0 - **Artifact files:** 24 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,326,415 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()