@quotient-forecasting/cassie-skill@0.4.18: Suspicious npm | LPM Firewall

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@quotient-forecasting/cassie-skill@0.4.18: Suspicious npm | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node install.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node install.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

36"scripts": { "postinstall": "node install.mjs" } }

Medium

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

package.json runs install.mjs automatically through postinstall.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L36

install.mjsView file

3L4: import { cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; L5: import { homedir } from "node:os"; ... L12: function defaultRoots() { L13: return [join(homedir(), ".agents", "skills"), join(homedir(), ".claude", "skills")]; L14: } ... L27: const destination = join(root, "cassie"); L28: mkdirSync(destination, { recursive: true }); L29: cpSync(join(packageDir, "SKILL.md"), join(destination, "SKILL.md"), { force: true }); L30: cpSync(join(packageDir, "thesis"), join(destination, "thesis"), { recursive: true, force: true }); L31: installed.push(destination);

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

install.mjsView on unpkg · L3

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: import { cpsync, existssync, mkdirsync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"; import { fileurltopath } from "node:url"; const packagedir = dirname(fileurltopath(import.meta.url)); const workspaceroot = resolve(packagedir, "../.."); function defaultroots() { return [join(homedir(), ".agents", "skills"), join(homedir(), ".claude", "skills")]; } export function installcassieskill(options = {}) { const override = process.env.cassie_skills_dir?.trim(); if (!options.force && process.env.cassie_skip_skill_install === "1") return [];

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

install.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 0da900ca224fb098 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @quotient-forecasting/cassie-skill@0.4.17 matchedPath = install.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.4.17 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

install.mjsView on unpkg

12function defaultRoots() { return [join(homedir(), ".agents", "skills"), join(homedir(), ".claude", "skills")]; } export function installCassieS

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

The installer targets the user's .agents/skills and .claude/skills directories by default.

install.mjsView on unpkg · L12

27const destination = join(root, "cassie"); mkdirSync(destination, { recursive: true }); cpSync(join(packageDir, "SKILL.md"), join(destination, "SKILL.md"), { force: true }); cpSync(join(packageDir, "thesis"), join(destination, "thesis"), { recursive: true, force: true }); installed.push(destination

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

Writes are confined to a cassie subdirectory containing the package's SKILL.md and thesis files.

install.mjsView on unpkg · L27