AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiLPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. Explicit CLI use can install a per-user Mach background agent. Cloud-build commands send project build inputs and generated artifacts to the package's configured Mach service or supplied presigned URLs; no install-time attack surface is confirmed.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `dist/index.js` exposes explicit `mach agent install` background-service setup.
- Agent installation writes per-user macOS/Linux/Windows service definitions and invokes `launchctl`, `systemctl --user`, or `schtasks.exe`.
- `dist/index.js` includes cloud-build scripts that upload logs/artifacts through presigned URLs.
- `dist/chunk-S64YFTRR.js` sends authenticated CLI requests to `https://mach-api.securejs.in`.
- `package.json` has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- The persistence behavior is reached through the user-invoked `agent` command, not installation or import.
- The agent is described as a local Install Hub discovery service on port 7070.
- No AI-agent configuration/control-surface paths or credential-harvesting-and-exfiltration chain was confirmed.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage contains a critical-looking secret pattern.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1429A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L17A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L623Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L623Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1