@rafaelsene01/agent-flow@1.0.2

The package's main and bin entry, dist/agent-flow.js, is shipped as a heavily obfuscated bundle produced by javascript-obfuscator (declared as a devDependency in package.json). After deobfuscation, the runtime behavior matches the advertised purpose: a local Express server bound to 127.0.0.1:5522 that talks to api.github.com using the user-provided GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable (or the local `gh auth token` output), manages git worktrees, and spawns the local `claude` CLI. No remote code fetch, no eval of remote content, no read of installer secret paths (~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc), and no exfiltration destination beyond api.github.com. The postinstall hook only runs `npm install --prefix web` when `web/package.json` exists, which it does not in the published tarball. Obfuscating an MIT-licensed distributed bundle is a code-review-hostility concern rather than a supply-chain attack, but it materially raises the cost of independent verification and warrants human review. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a5df09db75f73bdebd523abf5b350fca006eafabadfeef16baccd7043191dc61) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.