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@rajatpal96/tokentrail@1.0.11: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

registry / @rajatpal96/tokentrail / 1.0.11

@rajatpal96/tokentrail@1.0.11

TokenTrail CLI - AI Coding Agent Usage & Observability Platform

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Running the CLI creates a detached background collector that monitors Claude transcripts and uploads collected event metadata, including thinking snippets. The collector also runs from the default status command.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Any execution of the tokentrail CLI, including no-argument status.

Impact

Sensitive AI-agent transcript metadata and reasoning excerpts can be exfiltrated to the package service without a dedicated sync action.

Mechanism

persistent transcript monitoring and HTTPS event upload

Attack narrative

The manifest exposes the CLI without an install hook, but every CLI invocation starts a detached daemon. That daemon monitors ~/.claude/projects, recursively reads transcript JSONL, extracts tool names and up to 200 characters of thinking, then POSTs event batches to the configured API, defaulting to TokenTrail's host. The default status command also synchronizes transcripts, so collection and persistence occur without the user explicitly choosing sync or watch.

Rationale

The package implements concrete background persistence and collection/upload of AI transcript-derived data on ordinary CLI execution. The lack of an npm install hook reduces propagation risk but does not remove the unconsented runtime exfiltration surface.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/tokentrail.jsbin/agentpulse.jssrc/hooks/index.ts~/.claude/projects~/.tokentrail/config.json~/.tokentrail/daemon.pid~/.tokentrail/claude_synced.json~/.tokentrail/collector.db

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

bin/tokentrail.jsView file

6Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L6: import readline from 'readline'; L7: import http from 'http'; L8: import { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; L9: import Database from 'better-sqlite3'; L10: L11: const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.tokentrail'); L12: const LEGACY_CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.agentpulse'); ... L31: const raw = fs.readFileSync(configFile, 'utf-8'); L32: existingConfig = JSON.parse(raw); L33: backupPath = path.join(claudeDir, `config.backup.${Date.now()}.json`); ... L37: L38: const endpoint = process.env.TOKENTRAIL_INGEST_URL || process.env.AGENTMETER_INGEST_URL || 'https://api.tokentrail.xyz/v1/events';

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L6

7import http from 'http'; L8: import { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; L9: import Database from 'better-sqlite3';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L7

822const port = server.address().port; L823: const callbackUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/callback`; L824: const dashboardUrl = process.env.TOKENTRAIL_DASHBOARD_URL || 'https://www.tokentrail.xyz'; L825: const authUrl = `${dashboardUrl}?cli_callback=${encodeURIComponent(callbackUrl)}&cli_state=${authState}`; ... L831: const openCmd = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.platform === 'win32' ? 'start' : 'xdg-open'; L832: exec(`${openCmd} "${authUrl}"`, () => {}); L833:

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L822

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. bin/tokentrail.js: import readline from 'readline'; const claudeDir = path.join(this.homeDir, '.claude'); fs.writeFileSync(backupPath, raw); fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(updatedConfig, null, 2)); message: 'TokenTrail hook merged safely into ~/.claude/config.json', fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)); const codexDir = path.join(this.homeDir, '.codex'); fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2));

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg

6import readline from 'readline'; L7: import http from 'http'; L8: import { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; L9: import Database from 'better-sqlite3'; L10: L11: const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.tokentrail'); L12: const LEGACY_CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.agentpulse'); ... L31: const raw = fs.readFileSync(configFile, 'utf-8'); L32: existingConfig = JSON.parse(raw); L33: backupPath = path.join(claudeDir, `config.backup.${Date.now()}.json`); ... L37: L38: const endpoint = process.env.TOKENTRAIL_INGEST_URL || process.env.AGENTMETER_INGEST_URL || 'https://api.tokentrail.xyz/v1/events';

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L6

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

bin/tokentrail.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2

3import path from 'path';

4import fs from 'fs';

5import os from 'os';

6import readline from 'readline';

7import http from 'http';

8import { exec, spawn } from 'child_process';

9import Database from 'better-sqlite3';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L7

10

11const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.tokentrail');

12const LEGACY_CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.agentpulse');

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L6

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg · L6

13const CONFIG_FILE = path.join(CONFIG_DIR, 'config.json');

14

15class SafeHookManager {

16 homeDir = os.homedir();

17

18 async connectClaude() {

19 const claudeDir = path.join(this.homeDir, '.claude');

20 const configFile = path.join(claudeDir, 'config.json');

21

22 if (!fs.existsSync(claudeDir)) {

23 fs.mkdirSync(claudeDir, { recursive: true });

24 }

25

26 let existingConfig = {};

27 let backupPath;

Lines 802-842javascript

802 </body>

803 </html>

804 `);

805

806 server.close();

807

808 console.log(`\n\x1b[32m✔ Successfully authenticated via browser${email ? ` as ${email}` : ''}!\x1b[0m

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. bin/tokentrail.js: import readline from 'readline'; const claudeDir = path.join(this.homeDir, '.claude'); fs.writeFileSync(backupPath, raw); fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(updatedConfig, null, 2)); message: 'TokenTrail hook merged safely into ~/.claude/config.json', fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)); const codexDir = path.join(this.homeDir, '.codex'); fs.writeFileSync(configFile, JSON.stringify(config, null, 2));

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

bin/tokentrail.jsView on unpkg