registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 10.13.71
@rallycry/conveyor-agent@10.13.71
Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found boot-time changes to Claude Code configuration and permissions, a guarded agent capability that warrants warning under the package policy. The package has no npm install hook, and the inspected source does not confirm exfiltration or malicious payload execution.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running the package's boot flow in an agent container.
Impact
The setup changes agent configuration and tool approval behavior for the running environment.
Mechanism
Boot modifies Claude configuration locations and generated settings install hooks and an allow list used by Claude Code.
AI rationale
Static inspection found boot-time changes to Claude Code configuration and permissions, a guarded agent capability that warrants warning under the package policy. The package has no npm install hook, and the inspected source does not confirm exfiltration or malicious payload execution.
Evidence
dist/boot-PKHZUDAC.jsdist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json has no install hook; `prepublishOnly` runs `tsup`.
- Boot setup wires Claude configuration into the home directory and copies legacy credentials into pod-local storage.
- Boot setup deletes and reseeds `~/.claude.json` and links Claude config directories.
- The bundle writes hook helper and settings files for Claude Code.
- Generated Claude settings allow tool calls and install PreToolUse and PostToolUse hooks.
Evidence against
- Boot requires `CONVEYOR_CONTAINER_ROLE` plus `CONVEYOR_API_URL` and `POD_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN`; the inspected code does not establish credential exfiltration.
- The observed configuration changes are first-party agent setup during boot, with no inspected evidence of an unrelated remote payload or malicious persistence.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcedist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.jsView file
63function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L64: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L65: }
...
L71: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L72: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L73: headers,
...
L76: if (!response.ok) {
L77: const errorText2 = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L78: return {
...
L112: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L113: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L114: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.jsView on unpkg · L6363Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
L63: function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L64: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L65: }
...
L71: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L72: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L73: headers,
...
L76: if (!response.ok) {
L77: const errorText2 = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L78: return {
...
L112: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L113: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L114: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.jsFindings
4 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-PKHZUDAC.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-PKHZUDAC.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-7MMECTTJ.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-EXQ6AHOY.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityruntime/entrypoint.sh
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@10.13.71.
See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@10.13.71 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.