@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.23
Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged credential behavior is part of runtime agent setup, while package.json shows no install lifecycle hook and inspected source does not establish exfiltration. Because the package mutates agent configuration and static analysis is incomplete, classify it as suspicious and warn.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Workbench startup when the user-home integration setup runs.
Impact
Credentials become available through the configured shared workbench integration; no external recipient or unconsented npm install trigger was established.
Mechanism
The setup copies an existing credential file to the configured shared location, repoints the workspace credentials path, and applies restrictive file permissions.
AI rationale
The flagged credential behavior is part of runtime agent setup, while package.json shows no install lifecycle hook and inspected source does not establish exfiltration. Because the package mutates agent configuration and static analysis is incomplete, classify it as suspicious and warn.
Evidence
dist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 77.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json has a prepublishOnly build hook and no install lifecycle hook.
- Runtime workbench setup copies an existing Claude credential file into a shared directory and repoints the workspace credential path.
- The grimoire setup checks for an existing workspace integration and a GitHub token before fetching missing content.
- The transcript helper derives a Claude config path and project transcript path; the cited code does not establish credential transmission.
- Bootstrap polling sends its supplied token to the configured API URL, consistent with bootstrap operation.
- The flagged behavior is a first-party agent integration capability; the incomplete static analysis leaves the overall review unresolved.
Evidence against
- Inspected source does not establish unconsented npm install-time mutation, credential exfiltration, or a concrete attack chain.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcedist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.jsView file
31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.jsView on unpkg · L3131Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.jsView on unpkg · L3131Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
High
Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.
dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.jsView on unpkg · L31•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11
matchedPath = dist/chunk-YMZ6Q55T.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.jsView on unpkgdist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.jsView file
35// src/boot/index.ts
L36: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";
...
L57: provider,
L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`,
L59: repoOwner,
...
L69: function parseBundle(text) {
L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text);
L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars;
...
L171: const emit = (line) => {
L172: process.stdout.write(`${line}
L173: `);
Critical
Persistence Backdoor
Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.
dist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.jsView on unpkg · L35•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21
similarity = 0.963
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.jsView on unpkg35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.js
L35: // src/boot/index.ts
L36: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";
...
L57: provider,
L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`,
L59: repoOwner,
...
L69: function parseBundle(text) {
L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text);
L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars;
...
L171: const emit = (line) => {
L172: process.stdout.write(`${line}
L173: `);
High
Trigger Reachable Persistence
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.jsView on unpkg · L35runtime/entrypoint.shView file
•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 436
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkgdist/chunk-XJSW42TM.jsView file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/chunk-XJSW42TM.jsView on unpkgdist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11
matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkgdist/chunk-W5INK3NE.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11
matchedPath = dist/chunk-JG3VMWRQ.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-W5INK3NE.jsView on unpkgFindings
4 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-S73ZNWBJ.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-XJSW42TM.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-I7QYTA2V.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-W5INK3NE.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.23.
See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.23 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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