@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.24: Agent extension lifecycle risk

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source shows package-owned runtime setup that weakens Claude Code's approval prompts, a guarded agent capability that warrants warning. No concrete credential theft or install-time attack was established in the inspected source.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Starting a structured-event Claude agent session; the package manifest does not run this setup during npm installation.

Impact

Agent tool approval prompts are suppressed in this runner, reducing the user's opportunity to review tool actions during a session.

Mechanism

The runner writes a temporary hook helper and settings file, including skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt and an allow list.

AI rationale

The source shows package-owned runtime setup that weakens Claude Code's approval prompts, a guarded agent capability that warrants warning. No concrete credential theft or install-time attack was established in the inspected source.

Evidence

dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json defines only a prepublishOnly lifecycle hook, which runs tsup.
dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.js writes a per-run hook helper and settings file in a temporary directory.
Structured-event sessions call that setup and enable skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt; build-capable agent spawns use bypass-permission mode.

Evidence against

The settings are generated for structured-event agent sessions, consistent with the package's agent-runner functionality.
dist/boot-65PTSADA.js wires Claude credentials into the mounted user-home setup; the inspected code copies a credential file and points a symlink to it.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 26 file(s), 1.02 MB of source, external domains: api.conveyor.rallycryapp.com, github.com

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

27

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-YMZ6Q55T.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg · L35

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.926 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-65PTSADA.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg · L31

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-YMZ6Q55T.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.jsView on unpkg

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg · L35

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.926 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-65PTSADA.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg · L35

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Findings

4 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-65PTSADA.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-65PTSADA.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-65PTSADA.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-HW6SHIL7.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-YNI2HFZE.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code