registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.26

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.26

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection confirms guarded workbench setup that seeds Claude permission and trust settings and may expose SSH on the configured port. That concrete platform capability warrants a warning, while the inspected evidence does not establish malicious behavior or a block-eligible attack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Starting the package’s workbench boot flow.

Impact

The setup lowers Claude onboarding and permission prompts and exposes SSH on the configured port in the workbench environment.

Mechanism

The boot flow writes seeded Claude configuration and starts SSH using keys from the Conveyor shared mount.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/boot-65PTSADA.js/home/conveyor/.claude.json/home/conveyor/.ssh/authorized_keys

Network endpoints1

0.0.0.0:2222

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes agent-runner commands and a library entrypoint, with publishing limited to the build hook.
Workbench boot seeds Claude configuration with onboarding, trust-dialog, and permission-mode acceptance values.
Workbench boot can start an SSH server listening on all interfaces and copy authorized keys from the Conveyor shared mount.
A bootstrap token is sent to the configured API URL’s bootstrap route; the inspected code does not show a separate credential recipient.
The other flagged locations concern loading a configured repository submodule and resolving Claude transcript paths.

Evidence against

No npm install lifecycle hook is declared; the only publish hook runs the build tool.
The inspected source does not establish a hidden credential-exfiltration sink or an unrelated persistence target.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-YMZ6Q55T.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView on unpkg

dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-WCJ6HRVU.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-Q4FQOJ7D.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js"

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-4L22UNZD.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-4L22UNZD.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js

Findings

4 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-65PTSADA.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-65PTSADA.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-65PTSADA.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-4L22UNZD.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-BZZ4B37Q.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helper

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.26.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.26 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:28:56.996Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.