registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.27
@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.27
Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection did not establish credential exfiltration, persistence, or unconsented broad agent configuration changes. The flagged behaviors are consistent with conditional workbench home wiring, workspace submodule setup, transcript-path construction, and process monitoring.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running the workbench boot flow with a bootstrap bundle activates mounted-home wiring; workspace setup may fetch the grimoire submodule when its directory is absent.
Impact
No malicious impact was established from the inspected code.
Mechanism
Credential files are copied and linked within the configured workbench home. Bootstrap requests use the supplied API URL, and the inspected snippets do not show credential forwarding to an unrelated recipient.
AI rationale
Source inspection did not establish credential exfiltration, persistence, or unconsented broad agent configuration changes. The flagged behaviors are consistent with conditional workbench home wiring, workspace submodule setup, transcript-path construction, and process monitoring.
Evidence
.claude/.credentials.json
Network endpoints1
github.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes package CLI and library entrypoints; its lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, not an install hook.
- Workbench home wiring runs only when a bootstrap bundle exists and builds paths from workbench home, mount, user, and project values.
- Credential wiring copies a legacy project Claude credential file into pod-local storage and repoints a symlink within the workbench home setup.
- The grimoire fetch is conditional on a missing workspace submodule and an available GitHub token.
- The flagged Claude helper derives project transcript paths under Claude’s configured home.
- The watchdog reads process information for resource management; inspected code shows no credential collection or external send.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcedist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.jsView file
31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.jsView on unpkg · L3131Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.jsView on unpkg · L3131Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) {
L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");
L33: }
...
L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;
L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {
L41: headers,
...
L44: if (!response.ok) {
L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");
L46: return {
...
L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken);
L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN);
L82: let lastReason = "unknown";
High
Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.
dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.jsView on unpkg · L31•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11
matchedPath = dist/chunk-YMZ6Q55T.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.jsView on unpkgdist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView file
35// src/boot/index.ts
L36: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";
...
L57: provider,
L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`,
L59: repoOwner,
...
L69: function parseBundle(text) {
L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text);
L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars;
...
L171: const emit = (line) => {
L172: process.stdout.write(`${line}
L173: `);
Critical
Persistence Backdoor
Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.
dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg · L35•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21
similarity = 0.889
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-65PTSADA.js
L35: // src/boot/index.ts
L36: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";
...
L57: provider,
L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`,
L59: repoOwner,
...
L69: function parseBundle(text) {
L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text);
L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars;
...
L171: const emit = (line) => {
L172: process.stdout.write(`${line}
L173: `);
High
Trigger Reachable Persistence
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/boot-65PTSADA.jsView on unpkg · L35runtime/entrypoint.shView file
•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 436
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkgdist/chunk-7HK6OIV4.jsView file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/chunk-7HK6OIV4.jsView on unpkgdist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11
matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkgFindings
4 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-65PTSADA.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-65PTSADA.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-65PTSADA.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-7HK6OIV4.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-PBSFLQA7.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.27.
See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.27 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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