registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.33

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.33

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection found runtime setup that silently seeds Claude permission and trust acceptance, a concrete agent configuration risk. The changes are runtime-triggered and the manifest has no install hook, so the evidence supports a warning rather than a block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The package’s runtime boot flow invokes user-home wiring.

Impact

Claude may treat onboarding, project trust, and permission-bypass acceptance as already granted in the runtime environment.

Mechanism

Setup writes seeded Claude settings, creates configuration links, and carries credentials into pod-local storage.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsdist/chunk-37J5MMQT.jsdist/chunk-A73WZJ4Y.jsdist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsdist/cli.js

Network endpoints1

api.conveyor.rallycryapp.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The runtime seeds Claude configuration with onboarding and trust already accepted, including permission-bypass acceptance.
Runtime home wiring applies that setup and manages Claude credentials and agent configuration.
Bootstrap requests send a bearer token to the configured Conveyor API; the CLI default is the package’s Conveyor service.
The manifest has no install hook; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly.

Evidence against

The permission and configuration changes occur during runtime home setup, not an npm install lifecycle.
The default bootstrap endpoint is the package’s Conveyor service.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView on unpkg · L31

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg · L35

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.778 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-A73WZJ4Y.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-A73WZJ4Y.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js

Findings

4 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-IHNXVFIB.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-A73WZJ4Y.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.33.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.33 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:26:08.649Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.