registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.34

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.34

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected behavior supports a warning for guarded, package-owned agent extension setup, not a finding of malicious activity. The manifest has no install-time hook, and the reviewed network and credential operations are consistent with runtime workspace and service functions.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Runtime credential preparation when CONVEYOR_OPENCODE_OAUTH contains a valid seed.

Impact

The configured OpenCode environment may load the package’s plugin and use the seeded OAuth credentials.

Mechanism

The package writes OAuth data and its own plugin identifier into OpenCode configuration.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json defines only a prepublishOnly build hook; it has no install-time lifecycle hook.
The boot code copies an existing Claude credentials file into pod-local storage for runtime use.
The grimoire fetch is conditional on a workspace submodule and uses a supplied GitHub token with github.com.
File upload is an invoked workbench tool that requests an upload URL and PUTs the selected workspace file.
OpenCode setup writes this package’s plugin into the user configuration when CONVEYOR_OPENCODE_OAUTH parses successfully.
The OpenCode auth seed and plugin setup are invoked from the runtime credential preparation path.

Evidence against

The inspected source shows no confirmed credential forwarding to an unrelated recipient or install-time attack.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 26 file(s), 1.06 MB of source, external domains: api.conveyor.rallycryapp.com, github.com

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-EKTPDG3G.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-Q4FQOJ7D.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js"

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg · L35

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.778 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg · L35

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Findings

4 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-IQP2LHB4.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.34.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.34 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:26:09.148Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.