registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.35

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.35

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package provides a first-party agent runner that sets up session-scoped hooks and reduced prompts for its spawned agent, which merits a warning under the agent capability policy. The reviewed credential and SSH behaviors fit the package’s bootstrap and workspace setup, and the manifest shows no install-time execution hook.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Starting a PTY agent session.

Impact

The spawned agent can operate with reduced interactive approval prompts under the package’s session gate, increasing the impact of an unsafe agent action.

Mechanism

The session creates hook settings in a temporary directory, including tool approval settings and hooks that relay tool requests through a local socket.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/chunk-MYJQXN6E.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

When the PTY session starts, the code creates a temporary directory and writes Claude hook settings there for the spawned agent.
Those settings suppress the dangerous-mode permission prompt and configure tool approvals, creating a guarded agent capability that warrants a warning.
The package manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its prepublishOnly script runs the build tool.
The inspected credential bootstrap sends a bootstrap token to the configured API URL, consistent with the package’s bootstrap flow.
The SSH setup uses persisted authorized keys and starts workspace SSH on a configurable port, consistent with workspace access setup.

Evidence against

The Claude hook settings are written to a session temporary directory, not a persistent user-wide agent configuration path.
The reviewed bootstrap request sends its token to the configured API URL; these excerpts do not establish credential theft or an unrelated recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVars

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-EKTPDG3G.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-Q4FQOJ7D.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js"

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-MYJQXN6E.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-MYJQXN6E.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

Findings

4 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-VDK54VLS.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-MYJQXN6E.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.35.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.35 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:26:13.233Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.