registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.39

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.39

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The scanner’s credential and persistence hints are not supported as malicious behavior by the inspected source: the reviewed credential operations are local copies or bootstrap response handling, with no foreign destination shown. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the reviewed agent configuration behavior is package-aligned.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Running the package’s command entrypoints activates runner setup and bootstrap behavior.

Impact

No unconsented credential exfiltration, install-time mutation, or agent control hijack was established.

Mechanism

The inspected code copies Claude credentials locally, conditionally retrieves a declared missing workspace submodule, and derives Claude project paths from the current workspace and session.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json exposes command entrypoints and has only a build command in its prepublish hook; it declares no install lifecycle hook.
The boot helper copies Claude credentials from a shared project location to a pod-local file and repoints the local credentials link.
The Grimoire helper proceeds only when the workspace declares the submodule, its files are absent, and a GitHub token is available.
The Claude project helper derives transcript paths from the Claude config directory, workspace path, and session ID.
Bootstrap code fetches configuration from a supplied API URL and returns the response body; inspected code does not show it sending local credentials to that endpoint.
The watchdog helper inspects process statistics and excludes its own process group when identifying foreign groups.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 26 file(s), 1.07 MB of source, external domains: api.conveyor.rallycryapp.com, github.com

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-EKTPDG3G.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-Q4FQOJ7D.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js"

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-735H53UF.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-735H53UF.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.jsView on unpkg · L31

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg · L35

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.778 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView on unpkg · L35

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-735H53UF.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-735H53UF.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Findings

4 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-B4YQABDZ.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-735H53UF.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.39.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.39 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:28:58.308Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.