@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.40
Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install-time lifecycle hook, and the flagged source paths show package-aligned boot, bootstrap, submodule, and watchdog behavior. The inspected code does not establish credential exfiltration or another concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines only a prepublishOnly build hook; install-time hooks are absent.
- The boot code copies Claude credentials into a pod-local file and repoints the credentials symlink as part of boot setup.
- Grimoire submodule setup checks for the project's .gitmodules entry and requires a GitHub token.
- Claude configuration paths use CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR or the user's .claude directory.
- Bootstrap refresh requires configured bootstrap credentials or a Codespaces name, then uses the configured API URL.
- The OOM watchdog reads process information and supports disabling or tuning via environment variables.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourceSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/chunk-UB7QZE25.jsView on unpkg · L31A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/chunk-UB7QZE25.jsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.40.
See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.40 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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