registry / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.41

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.41

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source supports a warning for first-party agent configuration that reduces approval safeguards. The flagged credential and network behavior inspected is consistent with local credential wiring and package service bootstrap; it does not establish a concrete attack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The agent runtime calls its settings setup while preparing an agent session.

Impact

Agent actions may proceed with fewer interactive safeguards in the configured environment.

Mechanism

It writes a helper and Claude Code settings, including a setting that suppresses the dangerous-mode prompt and automatic tool approvals.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/chunk-SELXSOT7.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package has no npm install hook; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly running the build.
When the agent settings setup runs, it writes a helper and settings file under a supplied directory.
The generated Claude Code settings suppress the dangerous-mode prompt and enable automatic tool approvals.
The boot code copies Claude credentials between package-specific user-home locations and repoints a credentials symlink; this is credential handling, not evidence of external transmission.
The grimoire submodule fetch is conditional on a GitHub token and targets github.com.
The flagged session transcript path is derived from the configured Claude home and project directory.

Evidence against

The inspected manifest contains no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The inspected bootstrap request uses the configured API URL; the source excerpt does not show credential forwarding to an unrelated endpoint.
The inspected credential wiring copies credentials locally, and the submodule fetch is guarded by a token check.

Behavioral surface

Source

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView file

Lines 11-51javascript

11 writeGitCredential

12} from "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

13import {

14 buildConveyorSocketOptions,

15 callWithAck,

16 heartbeatStatusFor,

17 loopStatusForRunnerStatus,

18 waitForConnected

19} from "./chunk-IA45XHOA.js";

20import {

21 WorkbenchError,

22 getWorkbenchClient

23} from "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

24import {

25 workbenchEnabled

26} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28// src/setup/bootstrap.ts

29var BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e4;

30var RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [5e3, 1e4, 2e4];

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) {

32 process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n");

33}

34async function singleBootstrapAttempt(apiUrl, instanceName, bootstrapToken, timeoutMs) {

35 const controller = new AbortController();

36 const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);

37 try {

38 const headers = {};

39 if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken;

40 const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, {

41 headers,

42 signal: controller.signal

43 });

44 if (!response.ok) {

45 const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => "");

46 return {

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView on unpkg · L31

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView on unpkg · L31

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView on unpkg · L31

47 ok: false,

48 status: response.status,

49 errorText: errorText.slice(0, 500),

50 reason: response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "auth_rejected" : "http_error"

51 };

dist/boot-T5HQVF3W.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-EKTPDG3G.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-Q4FQOJ7D.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js"

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-SELXSOT7.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-SELXSOT7.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView file

31function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.jsView on unpkg · L31

31Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.js L31: function emitFailureEvent(payload) { L32: process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(payload) + "\n"); L33: } ... L39: if (bootstrapToken) headers["x-codespace-token"] = bootstrapToken; L40: const response = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/codespace/bootstrap/${instanceName}`, { L41: headers, ... L44: if (!response.ok) { L45: const errorText = await response.text().catch(() => ""); L46: return { ... L80: const hasBootstrapToken = Boolean(opts.bootstrapToken); L81: const hasTaskToken = Boolean(process.env.CONVEYOR_TASK_TOKEN); L82: let lastReason = "unknown";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-CG7AHC25.js

Findings

4 Critical4 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-CG7AHC25.js

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-CG7AHC25.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/chunk-CG7AHC25.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-T5HQVF3W.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-SELXSOT7.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.41.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.41 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:28:52.454Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.