registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @rallycry/conveyor-agent / 11.0.48

@rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.48

Conveyor Agent Runner v10 - PTY harness for the task chat (SDK harness for audit/project-chat). Agent-as-User architecture with BaseService patterns. Works locally too.

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected runtime boot code silently replaces Claude configuration and rewires credential storage, which warrants a warning for agent configuration capability. No npm install attack or concrete exfiltration chain was established.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The package's runtime boot path executes.

Impact

Existing Claude configuration can be replaced and agent settings or credential-file locations changed.

Mechanism

Boot removes and reseeds the home Claude configuration, adds project trust and a model option, and copies credentials into pod-local storage before linking the paths.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js.claude.json.claude/.credentials.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The manifest has no install hook; its prepublishOnly script runs the build.
Runtime boot code deletes and recreates the user home Claude configuration file, seeds project trust and model settings, and wires Claude credentials into pod-local storage.
The agent harness configures broad tool permissions and command hooks when the harness runs.
The grimoire setup uses a supplied GitHub token only when the workspace submodule is missing.

Evidence against

The inspected configuration changes are in runtime boot code, not an npm install lifecycle.
The inspected sources show no credential transmission to an unrelated endpoint or other concrete attack chain.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView file

Lines 15-55javascript

15import "./chunk-EKTPDG3G.js";

16import {

17 GitPrepJob,

18 defaultGit,

19 ensureDir,

20 reportBootMilestone

21} from "./chunk-VIUZS7V4.js";

22import "./chunk-W4LZ7R6Z.js";

23import "./chunk-372R6E4C.js";

24import "./chunk-SQM2BQ7H.js";

25import {

26 workbenchPort

27} from "./chunk-KMB3BU4S.js";

28import {

29 DEFAULT_WORKBENCH_PORT

30} from "./chunk-6Q6LQBWO.js";

31import {

32 oomWatchdogOptionsFromEnv

33} from "./chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js";

35// src/boot/index.ts

36import { spawn } from "child_process";

37import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs";

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg · L35

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg · L35

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg · L35

38import { hostname as osHostname } from "os";

40// src/boot/bundle.ts

41function requireString(source, field) {

42 const value = source[field];

43 if (typeof value !== "string") {

44 throw new Error(`bundle missing field: ${field}`);

45 }

46 return value;

47}

48function parseGitPlan(raw) {

49 if (typeof raw !== "object" || raw === null) {

50 throw new Error("bundle missing field: gitPlan");

51 }

52 const obj = raw;

53 const provider = obj.provider === "forgejo" ? "forgejo" : "github";

54 const repoOwner = requireString(obj, "repoOwner");

55 const repoName = requireString(obj, "repoName");

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.21 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.21 similarity = 0.667 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg

runtime/entrypoint.shView file

•path = runtime/entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 436 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

runtime/entrypoint.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-JUEHUVSD.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-JUEHUVSD.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.11 matchedPath = dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:11.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView file

35// src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg · L35

35Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js L35: // src/boot/index.ts L36: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L37: import { statSync as statSync3 } from "fs"; ... L57: provider, L58: cloneUrl: typeof obj.cloneUrl === "string" ? obj.cloneUrl : `https://github.com/${repoOwner}/${repoName}.git`, L59: repoOwner, ... L69: function parseBundle(text) { L70: const raw = JSON.parse(text); L71: const envVarsRaw = raw.envVars; ... L171: const emit = (line) => { L172: process.stdout.write(`${line} L173: `);

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/boot-KDC4OLVL.jsView on unpkg · L35

Findings

3 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/boot-KDC4OLVL.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-JUEHUVSD.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/chunk-6W6UZ4SJ.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperruntime/entrypoint.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.48.

See all versions of @rallycry/conveyor-agent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rallycry/conveyor-agent@11.0.48 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 15:29:42.863Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.